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INTRODUCTION
The Miranda conundrum runs something like this. If the Miranda
decision represents true constitutional interpretation, and all un
warned statements taken during custodial interrogation are "com
pelled" within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the im* Baker & Botts Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. - Ed. My gratitude to
Hans Baade, Mitchell Berman, Jesse Choper, Mary Coombs, John Hart Ely, Mark Gergen,
Yale Kamisar, Douglas Laycock, Paul Mishkin, Scot Powe, George C. Thomas III, Chuck
Weisselberg, and Patrick Woolley for their comments, and Katrina Blodgett and Daniel
Riess for their research assistance. I thank the participants of this Symposium, the Legal
Theory Workshop at the University of Miami Law School, the Faculty Workshop at Boalt
Hall, and the Faculty Colloquium at Washington & Lee for probing questions. I especially
appreciate the generosity with which my colleague and mentor George Dix offered his time
and insights.
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peachment and "fruits" exceptions to Miranda should fall.1 If it is not
true constitutional interpretation, than the Court has no business re
versing state criminal convictions for its violation. I offer here what I
hope is a satisfying answer to this conundrum, on both descriptive and
normative levels, that justifies not only Miranda but a host of similar
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court decisions as well. In Part I, I in
troduce and define the terms "constitutional prophylactic rule," "con
stitutional safe harbor rule," and "constitutional incidental right,"2 and
attempt to legitimate their use. I further demonstrate that constitu
tional criminal procedure is so flush with such prophylactic and safe
harbor rules and incidental rights that trying to eliminate them now,
by either reversing a large number of criminal procedure cases or
"constitutionalizing" all of those holdings, would do more harm than
good. I propose that we accept the fact that these rules and rights are a
fixed part of our constitutional landscape, and focus instead on mini
mizing their risks and maximizing their benefits.
Thus, in Part II, I suggest that we can highlight their benefits; en
couraging dialogue and cooperation between the federal judiciary and
state and federal executive and legislative officers, fostering experi
mentation with new procedures that may work better, and providing
the flexibility to respond to new empirical and social science data
without reversing constitutional decisions; and cabin their risks; in
fringing on principles of federalism and separation of powers, hard
ening rules that should be flexible enough to respond to changing
facts, and deflecting attention away from actual constitutional viola
tions; by caution, deference, and what I call "truth-in-labeling." Cau
tion requires the Court to refrain from creating prophylactic or safe
harbor rules and incidental rights except where it clearly identifies the
mandate of the constitutional clause at issue and/or the values under
lying that clause, and then explains why a rule or right is necessary to
protect or adjudicate that clause. Deference requires the Court to
warn the other branches of the federal government and all branches of
the state governments that some action is necessary, and to act itself
only if the other actors fail to offer alternative procedures that are
within an acceptable range of functionality. Truth-in-labeling requires
the Court to identify each doctrinal rule it creates as being either an
explicit constitutional rule or remedy, or a prophylactic or safe harbor
1. These exceptions fall because they are not based upon the premise that the constitu
tional clause itself contains these exceptions to its implementation, but rather upon a holding
that the constitutional clause was not actually infringed. See, e. g. , Oregon v. Elstad,
U.S.
( noting that Miranda "serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more

298, 306 (1985)

470

broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth
Amendment violation") .

2.

The term "prophylactic rule" has been used by the scholars and the Court, though not
as I define it. I believe the terms "constitutional incidental right" and "constitutional safe
harbor rule" are my own invention, at least in this context.
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rule or incidental right, so that there is a clear signal that modification
may be permissible.
Finally, in Part Ill, I examine Chief Justice Rehnquist's embar
rassing failure in Dickerson v. United States to acknowledge, much less
resolve, the Miranda conundrum. Inexplicably, Miranda is no longer a
prophylactic rule (dashing all hopes for dialogue with other branches
and improved alternatives), though neither is it "true" constitutional
interpretation. Thus, an opportunity for a Court description of the
status and justification for the Miranda warnings, as well as an ac
knowledgment of the status and justification for the host of other
Court-created rules and rights that do not precisely track the constitu
tional clause that they concern, was squandered.
I.

IDENTIFYING AND JUSTIFYING PROPHYLACTIC RULES,
SAFE HARBORS, AND INCIDENTAL RIGHTS

I have argued elsewhere that the Miranda decision can best be ex
plained, both normatively and descriptively, as a constitutional pro
phylactic rule designed to assist the Court in protecting the privilege
against self-incrimination.3 The fate of Miranda's exceptions depends
upon how prophylactic rules are defined and the purposes they serve.
A foray through constitutional criminal procedure has convinced me
that the Miranda decision is far from unique. There are quite a num
ber of decisions where the Court, unable to precisely track the consti
tutional criminal procedural guarantee before it, created devices that
assist it in identifying and adjudicating constitutional violations, and
imposed those devices upon the federal executive branch and the
states. I categorized these devices as constitutional prophylactic rules,
constitutional safe harbor rules, and constitutional incidental rights.
The conceptual framework I develop in this Article for identifying and
formulating these rules and rights can be applied not just to the
Miranda decision and its exceptions, but throughout constitutional
criminal procedure.
A "constitutional prophylactic rule" is a judicially-created doc
trinal rule or legal requirement determined by the Court as appropri
ate for deciding whether an explicit or "true" federal constitutional
rule is applicable. It may be triggered by less than a showing that the
explicit rule was violated, but provides approximately the same result
as a showing that the explicit rule was violated. It is appropriate only
3. See Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause
and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 482-83 (1994) (suggesting that it is
the Court's obligation under the Constitution to create remedies or procedures necessary to
safeguard a particular constitutional provision otherwise at risk, and, while these remedies
and procedures may be "temporary and/or conditional" this '.' 'constitutional common law'
has the same status as 'true' constitutional interpretation" for purposes of civil rights ac
tions).
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upon two determinations: first, that simply providing relief upon a
showing that the explicit right was violated is ineffective; second, that
use of this rule will be more effective and involve only acceptable
costs. It should be clear that, thus defined, a constitutional prophylac
tic rule is purely instrumental; it strives to achieve the rule and/or
value inherent in that constitutional clause, and has no utility outside
of that function.
. . Conversely, a "constitutional safe harbor rule" is a judicially cre
ated procedure that, if properly followed by the government actor, in
sulates the government from the argument that the constitutional
clause at issue was violated. It may allow conduct that violates the ex
plicit constitutional rule to which it applies. It is appropriate only upon
two showings: first, that providing relief every time an explicit right is
violated is not feasible; second, that the use of this rule will involve
only acceptable costs.
The line between a prophylactic rule and safe harbor rule is this: A
prophylactic rule potentially overprotects the constitutional clause at
issue, while a safe harbor rule potentially underprotects it.4 That is, a
prophylactic rule will prohibit some government behavior that would
otherwise be declared constitutional without the rule, and the safe
harbor rule will allow some government behavior that would other
wise be declared unconstitutional without the rule.
Closely related to a prophylactic rule is a "constitutional incidental
right," a judicially-created procedure determined by the Court as the
appropriate relief for the violation of an explicit or "true" constitu
tional rule or a prophylactic rule. It is appropriate only upon two de
terminations: first, some relief is warranted, but no particular proce
dure is mandated by the constitutional rule itself; second, the relief is
effective and involves only acceptable costs. A constitutional inciden
tal right is likewise purely instrumental; it seeks to advance the text of
or values underlying the constitutional rule violated by either deter
ring future violations of that clause or reducing the harm visited upon
an aggrieved party, it has no utility outside of those functions.
The line between prophylactic and safe harbor rules and incidental
rights is this: An incidental right is what the court provides after the
violation of the constitution or prophylactic rule has already occurred.
A prophylactic or safe harbor rule is a standard for government be
havior designed to reduce violations or make alleged violations easier
to adjudicate. If the rule works, there will be no recognized violation
and no incidental right offered. If the prophylactic rule, safe harbor
4. See Appendices A and B for Venn diagrams providing examples of how a prophylac
tic rule can over- but not underprotect a constitutional right, and a safe harbor rule can un
der but not overprotect a constitutional right. If the reader were to draw Venn diagrams for
the other prophylactic and safe harbor rules discussed in sections A and B, she would find
similarly that the all the prophylactic rules overprotect, and all the safe harbors underpro
tect.

1034

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1030

rule, or explicit constitutional rule is violated, then the question of an
incidental right arises.
These definitions and categorizations build upon and expand the
groundbreaking work by Professor Henry Monaghan, who declared
"remedial rules" a species of "constitutional common law" over
twenty-five years ago.5 Almost fifteen years after Professor
Monaghan's article, Professor David Strauss, while not offering a con
stitutional theory supporting prophylactic rules, noted that the use of
such rules to protect First Amendment values are a fixed part of our
constitutional landscape.6 The Court itself sometimes uses the term
"prophylactic rule," though it never defines or attempts to justify it.
On the other hand, the Department of Justice under former Attorney
General Edwin Meese, Professor Joseph Grano, and Justice Antonin
Scalia have forcefully argued that prophylactic rules such as the
Miranda warnings are constitutionally illegitimate because not
authorized under Article III.7

5. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1, 2-3 (1975) ("[A] surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional 'interpre
tation' is best understood as something of a quite different order - a substructure of sub
stantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but
not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law
subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress.").
6. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190
(1988) (identifying prophylactic rules protecting the First Amendment, and suggesting that
" 'prophylactic' rules are not exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy but are a cen
tral and necessary feature of constitutional law"); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion
Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimension, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (forth
coming 2001) (arguing that the rules of germaneness and proportionality that emerge from
Nol/an and Dolan respectively are really prophylactic rules designed to enforce the right not
to be coerced into waiving one's Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for a taking);
Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic
Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1999) (comparing judicially-created prophylactic rules to
similar Talmudic rules); David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99
MICH. L. REV. 958 (2001).
7. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Truth in Crim. Just. Rep. No. 1, Rep. to the Att'y Gen. on the
Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437 (1989) (as
serting that Miranda "constituted a usurpation of legislative and administrative powers"); see
also Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2337 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that the power to impose prophylactic rules upon Congress and the States "is an immense
and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist"); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's
Constitutional Diffirnlties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 (1988);
Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of A rticle Ill Le
gitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985) [hereinafter Grano, Prophylactic Rules] ; Stephen J.
Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering
Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV . 938 (1987) (defending the finding of the Department of
Justice report); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional
Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (1978) (suggesting that prophylactic rules are
"neither constitutional nor common law but pragmatism without either precedent or princi
ple - judicial realism radicalized and rampant").
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My response is twofold. First, scholars have already offered the
theoretical response.8 Though there is no general federal common law
displacing state rules of decisions where state law governs,9 there is
unquestionably federal common law created to interpret federal stat
utes as displacing conflicting state law,10 to protect enclaves of federal
interest,11 to provide rules of decision where the Court is granted ju
risdiction,12 and to flesh-out federal constitutional commands.°
Second, I offer a purely practical response. The Court cannot per
form miracles; if a constitutional theory requires the Court do the im
possible, there is something wrong with the theory, not with the Court.
As I demonstrate throughout the remainder of this Article, generating
constitutional prophylactic rules and incidental rights to protect con
stitutional values is a beneficial and necessary function of the judici
ary.
The Miranda decision is a perfect example of this. The Court tried
for thirty years to ensure that coerced confessions were not admitted
in criminal trials by examining each confession which came before it.14
The use of the "totality of the circumstance" test,15 requiring the Court
to thoroughly examine every detail about the individual defendant and
the particular interrogation at bar, taught the Court two things. One, it
was incapable of correctly identifying which custodial interrogations
resulted in compulsion and which did not. The Court never offered a
workable definition of "voluntary"; there were too many factors which
8. See generally PAUL BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
700, 770 (2d ed. 1973); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986) (suggesting federal courts have broad power to
create federal common law based upon statutes, jurisdictional grants, and the federal consti
tution).

SYSTEM

9. See Erie

R.R.

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

10. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 121 S. Ct. 101 (2001) (holding that
state law fraud claims are impliedly preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
11. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) ("(D]uties of
the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than
local law.").
12. For example, the Court has created a body of common law rules of decision in con
troversies between states and in cases of admiralty, based upon Article Ill's grant of jurisdic
tion. See, e.g. , Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965) (discussing conflicting claims to
tax); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961) (noting that the federal law of admi
ralty is necessary for uniformity and consistency).
13. See supra notes 3, 5-6.
14. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936).
15. The Court examined the conduct of the police in interrogating the suspect (threats
or promises, trickery, withholding food and water, the duration of the questioning, plays
upon sympathy, and the use of family and friends) and the characteristics of the suspect that
might make him susceptible to coercion (age, intelligence, education, psychological and
physical limitations).
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went into the indeterminate "voluntariness" equation; it was too diffi
cult to reconstruct an often lengthy interrogation session after the fact;
and it could not review a sufficient number of cases. Second, the Court
discovered that law enforcement was receiving no guidance on which
interrogation techniques were acceptable and which were not, which
in turn led to further constitutional violations. Thus the Court, in de
ciding to institute the Miranda warnings, did not have the option of
precisely adhering to the constitutional clause at issue; rather, it was
forced either to under- or overprotect the constitutional right. Without
the Miranda warnings, the Court will inadvertently admit some con
fessions that are compelled. With the Miranda warnings, the Court
will exclude some confessions that were not compelled. It seems to me
that either choice can plausibly be justified as constitutionally legiti
mate. There is no principled reason to believe that when a judicially
enforceable rule of constitutional law cannot perfectly map the consti
tutional right at issue, the Constitution favors judicial underprotection
over judicial overprotection. This is especially true when constitution
ally protected individual liberties are at stake.16
It is true that the Court may not hear a sufficient number of cases
interpreting nonconstitutional issues to ensure that lower state and
federal courts always get it right. I do not believe, however, that this
calls for creating prophylactic rules in interpreting federal statutes or
federal torts, for example. First, there is no reason to believe that ei
ther plaintiffs or defendants in ordinary civil litigation will suffer any
lopsided interpretation of the law, unlike the fate suffered by criminal
defendants.'7 Second, the stakes are much higher with criminal litiga
tion - when lower courts get it wrong, an individual may be wrong
fully imprisoned. It is, of course, for this reason that the federal consti
tution provides such extraordinary procedural protections in criminal
cases, from the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof18 to
free counsel for indigent defendants. 19
My conceptual framework for the creation of incidental rights will
likewise be based upon practicality. Scholars have already well ex
plained a court imposing a remedy, a close cousin to an incidental
right, despite the fact that such remedy will not always precisely re
store the aggrieved party to his rightful position as determined by sub-

16. But see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REY. 1212, 1219-20 (1978) (suggesting that structural
constitutional values are wisely underenforced by the judiciary but should be regarded as
legally valid to their conceptual limits by the other branches, but excluding criminal proce
dural guarantees).
17. See infra note 135.
18. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
19. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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stantive law, but will instead provide a little more or a little less.20
Though one might argue that what I call "incidental rights" are more
appropriate called constitutional remedies,21 my insistence on new
terminology acknowledges Court precedent that is unlikely to change.
The paradigmatic incidental right is the exclusionary sanction for a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court has quite definitively
stated that exclusion is not a personal remedy to which a defendant is
entitled.22 Moreover, using the term "incidental right" offers more
flexibility than the term "remedy." That latter term implies an enti
tlement to complete restoration of the status quo. The former term
strives to uphold the particular clause at issue, and thus permits the
Court, Congress, a state legislature, a state judge, or even a law en
forcement agency to experiment with different procedures for up
holding that clause, which may or may not provide a remedy to the
aggrieved party.
A. Constitutional Prophylactic Rules
Constitutional criminal procedure is rife with prophylactic rules,
which most often take the form of rebuttable or conclusive evidentiary
presumptions or bright-line rules for law enforcement officials to fol
low. The Court finds the former necessary in cases where factfinding
would be particularly difficult, the latter necessary to guide officials
making snap judgment without legal training, and both justified by the
reality that the Court has limited time to hear individual cases. To my
knowledge, no one has combed through constitutional criminal proce
dural decisions to identify these rules. A nonexhaustive list of cases
involving what I would term prophylactic rules follows, ordered by
constitutional clause.
The automobile inventory search exception to the Fourth
Amendment's per se warrant requirement contains a prophylactic
rule. The exception was created to protect the vehicle and the property

20. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 272-76 (2d ed.
1994); David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure ofan Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing
the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 672 (1988). Professor Meltzer justi
fies what he calls "deterrent remedies" on the ground that the Court's "authority to declare
the scope and implications of rights, and its obligation to address claims for relief presented
by the parties - give it a distinctive claim to participate in the fashioning of deterrent reme
dies." Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials:
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private A ttorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 287 (1988);
see also Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857 (1999) (criticizing the failure of "rights essentialists" such as Professors Monaghan
and Sager to see that "remedial equilibration" more accurately describes constitutional in
terpretation).
21. My colleague Douglas Laycock insists that what
remedies, and that it would be clearer to say so.
22.

See infra

notes 83-84 and accompanying text.

I

call "incidental rights" are just
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in it, to safeguard the police or other officers from claims of lost pos
sessions, and to protect the police from potential danger.23 The pro
phylactic rule declares "unreasonable" any inventory search that is not
carried out in accordance with standard procedures in the local police
department.24 The purpose of the procedure requirement is to ferret
out pretextual searches; limiting officer discretion by forcing them to
follow procedures reduces the chance that an officer will use the in
ventory search exception to circumvent the requirements of probable
cause and a judicial warrant. The rule is overprotective because it will
exclude evidence obtained during an inventory search done at a sta
tion without standardized procedures for such searches, even if the
search was "reasonable" because it was conducted solely to protect
the police against false claims.25
The per se warrant requirement itself can be viewed as a prophy
lactic rule designed to ensure that searches are reasonable. Though
Justice Stewart famously said that searches conducted without a judi
cial warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,26
in light of the numerous "exceptions" crafted since 1948,27 it is difficult
to argue with a straight face that this remains true today. In fact, the
vast majority of searches are now conducted without a warrant, yet
they are regularly declared "reasonable" by the Court.28 The per se
warrant requirement has thus evolved into a presumption that a

23.

See

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).

24.
(1990).

See

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); see also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1

25. The Court crafted the same exception, along with the same prophylactic rule, in the
case of inventory searches of persons arrested. See Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
26. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). For a review of the debate among
Justices and scholars regarding the relationship between the warrant and the reasonableness
clauses of the Fourth Amendment, see Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principles and Current
Crises in Constillltional Criminal Procedure, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 533, 538-50 (1999).
27. The exceptions include consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973);
plain view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); the automobile exception,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); search incident to an arrest, Chime! v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969); inventory of automobiles, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976); exigent circumstances, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1 970); immigration road
blocks, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); sobriety checkpoints,
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1 990); closely regulated business inspec
tions, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); special needs searches, O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709 (1 987); and searches at the international border, United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606 (1978).
28. See, e.g., Richard Van Duizend
Perceptions, and Practices, NAT'L CTR.

et al., The Search Warrant Process: Preconceptions,
FOR ST. CT. REPS. (1 984) (offering anecdotal evi
dence by one police detective who estimated the figure as high as 98 percent); MARC L.
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES - THE POLICE 176 (1999) (stat
ing that it "is difficult to determine what proportion of searches are carried out based on
warrant, but the current appellate case law suggests a great majority of searches in most con
texts are conducted without first obtaining a warrant").
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search conduct without a warrant is unreasonable - a presumption
that can be rebutted by the prosecutor in any particular case.
Turning to the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, the
obvious place to begin is the Miranda decision itself.29 As I discussed
previously, the warnings themselves do not embody the rule or value
contained in the privilege, unless one makes the outlandish claim that
every statement made in response to police questioning while a person
is in custody is compelled. It is likely that many suspects already know
their rights and give voluntary statements because they think they can
outsmart the police, or their conscience gets the best of them - the
same reasons the great majority of suspects sign a waiver and make
statements even after the Miranda warnings are given.30 The warnings
are purely instrumental; their utility lies solely in how well they pro
tect the privilege by preventing compulsion and assisting the Court in
adjudicating these claims.
Miranda's prophylactic rule was extended in Edwards v. Arizona31
and Arizona v. Roberson32 to prohibit the introduction in a prosecu
tor's case-in-chief of any statements taken by officers who reap
proached a suspect for questioning after that suspect invoked her
Miranda right to counsel. This rule is prophylactic because there is
nothing valuable about prohibiting officers from questioning suspects,
and the rule may well exclude statements given voluntarily, and thus
not taken in violation of the explicit Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination.33 The Court extended this conclusive pre
sumption of compulsion yet again in Minnick v. Mississippi,34 when it
held that once a defendant invoked his Edwards right to an attorney
he cannot be reapproached for an interview unless that attorney is
physically present, even though the suspect consulted with his attorney
after the invocation of rights but before the reapproach. This rule does
not embody the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled
self-incrimination. Certainly there will be statements made in violation
of the Minnick rule where the defendant's will is not overborne - for
example, there may be cases where he simply changed his mind. De
spite its failing in particular cases, however, the rule instrumentally

29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30.

See infra

note 207.

31. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
32. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
33. For example, in Arizona v. Roberson, id. , a defendant had been arrested and
Mirandized for burglary and invoked his right to an attorney. Three days later a different
officer approached Roberson regarding a different burglary, Mirandized him, and obtained a
statement. There was no intentional misconduct by the officers, as the second officer was
unaware of the first officer's interrogation, and nothing suggested that Mr. Roberson's will
was overborne.
34. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
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advances Fifth Amendment values because, in most cases, it will be
difficult for the Court to determine after the fact whether persistent
attempts by official to persuade a defendant to waive his right resulted
in compulsion.
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause is also protected
by a prophylactic rule, at least in the multiple-punishment-in-a-single
trial scenario. In Missouri v. Hunter,35 the Court held that where two
criminal statutes proscribe the same offense under the Blockburger
test, they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in
the absence of clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.36
The rule is a prophylactic one because it does not precisely track the
underlying purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause in a single trial
situation - preventing the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended. Rather, it is instrumental, it
is a method by which we divine legislative intent and ensure that the
Clause is not violated. There will certainly be instances, however,
where the legislature intended cumulative punishments but did not
speak clearly enough for the Court,37 resulting in the vacation of a
punishment that the Constitution permits.
Moving to the Sixth Amendment, the Miranda Court also gave us
United States v. Wade,38 requiring the exclusion of an in-courtroom
identification of an accused when the accused participated in a post
indictment lineup without counsel.39 This rule is a prophylactic one be
cause the Court admits that not every post-indictment lineup in the
absence of counsel is suggestive and thus violative of the Sixth
Amendment and Due Process Clause if evidence of an identification
during such a lineup is admitted.40 Rather, the rule is a preventive one;
35. 459 U.S. 359 (1983). The Court framed this as a rule of statutory construction to pro
tect the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition of more punishment in a single proceeding
than authorized by the legislature.
36. See also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) (noting that cumulative
punishments can presumptively be assessed after a conviction for two offenses that are not
the same under Blockburger.)
37. In this setting, the prophylactic rule acts like a clear statement rule in statutory in
terpretation. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611-28
(1992) (detailing the Court's use of "super-strong clear statement rules" to protect constitu
tional structures).
38. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
39. As with the exclusion of evidence taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
judge will admit an in-court identification even after a post-indictment lineup in the absence
of counsel if the government establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court
identification was not an exploitation of the illegality but rather was based upon observation
of the suspect outside of the lineup. See id. at 240-41 .
40. Professor Grano argued that Wade's right t o counsel requirement i s not a prophylac
tic rule, but "is rooted squarely in the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision." Grano,
Prophylactic Rules, supra note 7, at 120-21 . This flatly contradicts the language in the Court
opinion itself. See infra text accompanying note 1 10 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 239).
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the pre-trial lineup "may not be capable of reconstruction at trial."41
There is no inherent value in having counsel at the lineup, nor does
the text of the Sixth Amendment require it. Its only value is instru
mental; counsel can "avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confron
tation at trial. "42
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is protected by a
prophylactic rule in the form of a conclusive presumption. In Bruton v.
United States,43 the Court reversed its holding in Delli Paoli v. United
States44 that the admission of a codefendant in a joint trial did not vio
late the Confrontation Clause so long as the jury was cautioned that
the confession was admissible only against the confessing party. There
is certainly no value in excluding voluntary reliable confessions, nor in
the increased cost and burdens on the state in severing trials. Moreo
ver, the Bruton rule will require reversing convictions where the jury
was able or would have been able to heed the cautionary instruction,
and the striking of state procedures that are not, in all instances, un
constitutional.45 The Court treated Bruton as a prophylactic rule in
Richardson v. Marsh,46 when it refused to extend Bruton to the admis
sion of a nontestifying codefendant's confession not directly linked to
the defendant because it would impair "both the efficiency and the
fairness of the criminal justice system."47 As the Richardson dissenters
noted, concerns about costs would not ordinarily offset a constitu
tional command.48
Another Sixth Amendment example can be found in Cuyler v.
Sullivan49 where the Court held that it will conclusively presume in
competency of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment whenever
there is an actual conflict of interest due to multiple representation
adversely affecting an attorney's performance. Such a presumption
grants additional protection to a defendant, who is ordinarily required
to show that the deficient performance of his counsel prejudiced his
defense.50 The Cuyler rule is a prophylactic one because it does not
41.

Wade,

42.

Id.

388 U.S. at 236.

43. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
44. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
45.

See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 196 n.2 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (describing Bruton as "prophylactic in nature").

46. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
47.

Id.

at 210.

48.

Id.

at 217-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

49. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
50. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a criminal judge
ment will not be reversed due to ineffective counsel unless the defendant establishes that his
counsel's performance was deficient, and that there was a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different).
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embody the text of the constitutional clause at issue, in that the defen
dant had "the assistance of counsel".51 Nor does the rule embody the
value underlying the Sixth Amendment, as counsel may have been
competent, the trial may have been a fair one, and the defendant may
well have been convicted despite the multiple representation. Simi
larly, the Court grants automatic reversal of a conviction when the
trial court failed to inquire about an apparent conflict, again without
requiring that the defendant establish prejudice.52 Finally, the Court
presumes prejudice where there is actual or constructive denial of the
assistance of counsel altogether,53 or state interference with counsel's
assistance.54 The reasons the Court provides for selectively over
protecting the Sixth Amendment fit nicely into my conceptual frame
work for prophylactic rules: "Prejudice in these circumstances is so
likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.
Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth
Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and be
cause the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government
to prevent."55
The Rehnquist Court most recently accepted a prophylactic rule
last term in Smith v. Robbins.56 In the 1967 case Anders v. California,57
the Court held that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses re
quired some procedure to protect an indigent defendant's constitu
tional right to appellate counsel. Finding the California procedure in
Anders unacceptable, the Court sketched its own procedure: the de
fendant's counsel must advise the Court that the appeal is "wholly
frivolous," "request permission to withdraw," and file a brief referring

51. U.S. CONST. amend.

VI.

52. See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347 (mandating reversal when the trial court has failed to
make an inquiry even though it "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict
exists"). The Court went further in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), where it held.that
the possibility of a conflict of interest at defendant's parole revocation hearing imposes on
the trial judge a duty to inquire further, and the breach of that duty mandates automatic re
versal of parole revocation.
53. See, e.g. , Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82 (1988) (striking procedure that allowed
counsel to withdraw before the court had determined whether counsel's evaluation of the
case on appeal was accurate). Professor Schulhofer argued that the Sixth Amendment right
of an indigent defendant to court appointed counsel is itself a kind of prophylactic rule de
signed to protect the constitutional value of a fair hearing. The Court conclusively presumes
the need for counsel to avoid the necessity of considering such factors as defendant's matur
ity, background, and education. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987).
54. See, e.g., Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) (conclusively presuming the prejudice
component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where a judicial order precluded a
testifying defendant's overnight consultation with his counsel).
55.

Strickland,

466 U.S. at 692.

56. 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000).
57. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.58 The
Robbins Court held that "[t]he procedure we sketched in Anders is a
prophylactic one; the States are free to adopt different procedures, so
long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to
appellate counsel."59 These rules are prophylactic because the proce
dures are not required by the text of the constitutional clauses at issue,
nor are they inherently valuable, nor do they embody the values un
derlying the constitutional clause they are designed to protect. The
value underlying this application of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses is that an indigent defendant receive approxi
mately the same justice as a rich one.60 Any procedures that ade
quately assure the Court of this are acceptable, and many different
'
procedures will surely suffice.
In Batson v. Kentucky,61 the Court created a prophylactic rule to
protect a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protec
tion by holding that a defendant can establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury based solely
on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal
lenges against potential jurors of the same race as the defendant,
shifting to the State the burden of coming forward with a neutral ex
planation for its challenges. This rule is prophylactic because it does
not directly embody the value of the Equal Protection Claus·e, which
protects against intentional discrimination. It is simply one method of
determining discrimination, a method that may well result in reversals
of convictions where the prosecutor did not intentionally discriminate
in her use of peremptory challenges, but was simply unable to marshal
the evidence to rebut the defendant's prima facie case.
To safeguard against judicial vindictiveness in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court in North
Carolina v. Pearce62 established a rule requiring that a sentencing
judge who imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a
new trial affirmatively state his reasons on the record, and those rea
sons must be based upon information concerning identifiable conduct
on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original
sentencing proceeding. The rule is prophylactic because there is no
58.

Id.

at 744.

59. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 753 (California procedures allow counsel to remain silent on
the merits of the case and offer to brief issues at the court's direction). See also Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (stating that Anders erects safeguards); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 (1987) (noting that the Anders procedures do not constitute an independent consti
tutional command, but rather a prophylactic framework).
60. See, e.g., McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988) (an indi
gent must receive "substantial equality" compared to the legal assistance that a defendant
with paid counsel would receive).
61 . 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
62. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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constitutional bar to the imposition of a more severe sentence upon
retrial, only one imposed "vindictively" (because the defendant exer
cised his right to appeal). The Pearce rule, like any presumption, will
invariably require the reversal and vacation of a sentence that was not
imposed vindictively, but where the presumption was inadequately re
butted by the judge.63 The prophylactic rule the Court imposed to pro
tect against vindictive judges in Pearce was extended to vindictive
prosecutors in Blackledge v. Perry.64 As with Pearce, the presumption
in Blackledge may well result in dismissal of charges the filing of which
would not violate due process, simply because the prosecutor failed to
rebut the presumption in the defendant's favor.
The Court in Jackson v. Denno65 struck down a New York proce
dure allowing the same jury to determine the voluntariness of the con
fession and the guilt of the defendant, despite a cautionary instruction
to disregard the confession in its entirety if the jury finds it was co
erced. This conclusive presumption is a prophylactic rule because
there is nothing inherently valuable in having a judge or a different
jury determine these two issues, nor is this rule dictated by the text of
the Amendment. Certainly there is some jury up to the task of sepa
rating its decisionmaking regarding the voluntariness of the confession
from its decisionmaking regarding other evidence of the defendant's
guilt, and in fact this might have happened in Jackson's case. Thus the
Court reversed a state court conviction that might not have suffered a
constitutional infirmity, and invalidated a state procedural rule that, at
least in some instances, would not run afoul of the federal
Constitution.

B.

Constitutional Safe Harbor Rules

Safe harbor rules provide that when an officer properly follows a
certain procedure, the Court will not entertain an argument from a
criminal defendant that, on the facts of his particular case, the search
was nonetheless unreasonable and violative of the Fourth
Amendment. Such rules may be necessary to offer clear guidance to
non-law trained officers, and to assist the Court in adjudicating claims.

63. The Court has, on numerous occasions, acknowledged this possibility. See, e.g. ,
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) ("It is an inherent attribute of prophylactic consti
tutional rules, such as those established in Miranda and Pearce, that their respective applica
tion will occasion windfall benefits for some defendants who have suffered no constitutional
deprivation.").
64. 417 U.S. 21 (1 974) (establishing a rebuttable presumption for prosecutorial vindic
tiveness when a prosecutor brings a more serious charge against a defendant seeking to ex
ercise his statutory right to a trial de nova following his conviction on a lesser included mis
demeanor.)
65. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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For example, the Court in Chime/ v. California66 held that an officer
can conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee and his "grab area"
consistent with the Fourth Amendment to protect that officer against
the arrestee's reach for a weapon, and to prevent the destruction of
physical evidence. The explicit constitutional rule is that a warrantless
search incident to an arrest conducted for such purposes is "reason
able" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Realizing that it
could not adequately determine on a case-by-case basis when the offi
cer had such a purpose, and that the case-by-case method of adjudica
tion gave little guidance to police, the Court created a safe harbor rule
that proof of a constitutionally valid arrest triggers a conclusive pre
sumption that the search of the arrestee was "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Robinson,67 the Court ex
tended this safe harbor rule to include containers found on an arrested
defendant's person and, in New York v. Belton,68 it further extended
the rule to the search of an entire passenger compartment of an ar
rested defendant's car. In Robinson, the container searched, a ciga
rette package in defendant's pocket, obviously contained neither a
weapon nor evidence of his offense of driving after the revocation of
his license. Likewise, in Belton, the officers were permitted to search a
leather jacket found in the back seat of the automobile, clearly out of
the reach of a defendant standing quite a distance from the automo
bile. The safe harbor rule was extended once more in Maryland v.
Buie to allow a protective sweep of rooms "adjoining the place of ar- .
rest from which an attack could be immediately launched.69 The Court
will not consider an argument by the defendant that the officers ar
resting him for mail fraud knew full well that such an attack would not
be forthcoming, and the officers were actually searching for his co
caine stash without probable cause or a warrant.
Though these safe harbor rules may permit searches without war
rants that might be "unreasonable" on their particular facts, they ad
vance the Court's ability to enforce the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment generally, because in many instances searches
of containers and passenger compartments of automobiles incident to
an arrest may reveal weapons and evidence of crime, and it is difficult
for the Court to determine ex post whether each particular search was
reasonable. This safe harbor rule also instrumentally advances the
Fourth Amendment mandate that all searches be reasonable in that it
66. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
67. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
68. 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) ("It is true, of course, that these containers will sometimes
be such that could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the
suspect was arrested."). Belton was identified as a "reverse prophylactic rule" by Professor
Stephen J. Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 439.
69. 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
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offers bright-line guidance for officers in the field, who might other
wise get it wrong.70
The Court made an identical move in expanding searches of auto
mobiles pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant require
ment (regardless of whether the driver is arrested). The original justi
fication for this exception was that cars are mobile, so there is no time
to obtain a warrant;71 to this was added the justification that a driver
has a decreased expectation of privacy in his automobile.72 In a series
of cases in from 1977 to 1982, the Court held that where an officer had
probable cause to believe that a particular container in an automobile
contained contraband or evidence of a crime, these justifications did
not apply and the officer must seize the container and obtain a war
rant before searching.73 However, about a decade later in California v.
Acevedo,74 the Court determined that officers and courts were "con
fused" by the distinction between probable cause to search the car
(permitting a warrantless search of the entire car, including closed
containers) and probable cause to search a container located in a car
(permitting a warrantless seizure but not a search), and thus created a
safe harbor rule that permits officers to conduct a warrantless search
in either case.
The Court has been rightly hesitant in accepting proposed safe
harbors. In Richards v. Wisconsin,75 the Court rejected Wisconsin's
proposed "blanket rule" excusing the otherwise applicable Fourth
Amendment "knock and announce" requirement when the search
warrant concerned a felony drug offense. Last term, in Illinois v.
Wardlow,76 the Court rejected the government's proposed safe harbor
rule that "reasonable suspicion" to justify a Terry detention is always
established by flight from a known police officer in a high-crime area.
In each of these cases, the Court determined that the proposed rule
70. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 ("In short, [a) single, familiar standard is essential to
guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the
social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.").
71.

See Chambers

v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

72. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). This was a strange case to select for
this expansion, as Mr. Carney lived in his motor home, and therefore had a greater expecta
tion of privacy than any of the defendants in the earlier automobile exception cases.
73. Compare United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (noting that, where officers
have probable cause to believe a double-locked footlocker in the open trunk of a parked car
contains a controlled substance, they cannot search without warrant), and Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 759 (1979) (noting that, where officers have probable cause to believe that
a suitcase in the closed trunk of a moving cab contains marijuana, they cannot search with
out a warrant), with United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (noting that, where officers
have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains a controlled substance, they may
search the entire vehicle, including containers, without a warrant).
74. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
75. 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
76. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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would vastly underprotect the Fourth Amendment. It is simply not
true, as an empirical matter, that most searches for controlled sub
stances carry a risk of physical harm to the police or destruction of
evidence (the justification for case-specific exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's knock and announce rule),77 nor is it true that in most
instances flight from an identified officer alone indicates that there is
criminal activity afoot (the Fourth Amendment justification for a brief
warrantless detention).78 Thus, the burden of proof remained with the
government to establish a safety risk in Richards, and to articulate its
reasons under the totality of the circumstances test for suspecting Mr.
Wardlow of criminal activity. In fact, the Court did entertain the ar
gument from those defendants that the government action was unrea
sonable in those particular cases.
C.

Constitutional Incidental Rights

As with prophylactic rules, no scholar has, to my knowledge, ana
lyzed the constitutional criminal procedural doctrines to identify rights
which are not themselves mandated by the constitutional clause the
right is designed to further. A nonexclusive list of what I call incidental
rights follows.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics19 is the first example of what I call an incidental right, at
least as the Court has subsequently interpreted that case. The Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
was allegedly violated in Bivens by federal agents effecting a residen
tial arrest and search without a warrant, and employing excessive
force. A constitutional incidental right, however, unlike a prophylactic
rule, does not seek to prevent the particular constitutional violation at
issue (quite impossible, since the violation already occurred). Rather,
it seeks to provide a personal remedy to the particular plaintiff, deter
future violations, or assist the Court in adjudicating or upholding con
stitutional rights. Nothing about the Fourth Amendment or the
Constitution in general mandates a money judgment as compensation
for a Fourth Amendment violation, or, perhaps, any remedy at all. Be-

77. Richards, 520 U.S. at 392-93 (noting that the "blanket exception" proposed by the
government "contains considerable overgeneralization").
78. The majority opinion did not take a stand on the empirical question, simply noting
that state courts disagree on whether unprovoked flight is sufficient grounds to constitute
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 n.1. The four
dissenters, agreeing that the Court should refrain from adopting a per se rule that unpro
voked flight by itself always or never constitutes reasonable suspicion, cited existing empiri
cal data indicating that minorities and those residing in high crime areas may flee even if in
nocent because "contact with the police can itself be dangerous." Id. at 132 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
79. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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cause Congress had not provided a remedy, the Bivens Court believed
it was necessary for it to step in, at least until Congress offered an al
ternative. I contend that Bivens actions for federal violations of consti
tutional rights are incidental rights rather than pure constitutional in
terpretation for two reasons. First, a damage action is not the only or
an indispensable method for protecting the underlying guarantee;
many other options, such as exclusion of the evidence or injunctive re
lief, are possible. Second, though it appeared that Bivens actions might
be constitutionally mandated in 1 971, and though many noted scholars
argued that the Constitution demands some remedy,8() it is inaccurate
at this time to say that Bivens actions are constitutionally required. As
Harlan's concurrence in Bivens and later Court cases make clear, the
Court is divining congressional intent rather than interpreting the fed
eral Constitution, and therefore will not examine the adequacy of the
congressional remedial scheme in the area affected by the alleged
wrongdoing.81
The best-known example of what I define as an incidental right is
the exclusionary sanction barring the admission of evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Though when it was first made
binding on the states in Mapp v. Ohio82 this exclusionary sanction ap
peared to be a constitutional requirement, this is no longer the case.
Post-Mapp cases have made clear that the admission of evidence ob
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, since the injury to the privacy of the victim
has already occurred and cannot be repaired.83 Rather, the exclusion
ary sanction is a judicially created procedure designed to deter future
Fourth Amendment violations.84 The exclusionary sanction does not
80. See, e.g. , Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies:
85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).

The Constitution as a Sword,

81. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the federal
common law in Bivens arose not directly from the Constitution, but rather from the combi
nation of the Court's historical ability to provide a remedy for the violation of individual lib
erties and an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412
(1988) (holding that Congress intended the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act
of 1984 to be the exclusive remedy for due process violation of wrongful termination of dis
ability benefits, though that act did not apply to plaintiffs); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367
(1983) (holding that there would be no damage remedy for federal civil servant's dismissal in
retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights because of alternative Congressional re
medial scheme).
82. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (stating that the witness
can be asked questions during a federal grand jury interrogation based on information re
sulting from an unlawful search as use of the improperly seized material "work[s] no new
Fourth Amendment wrong").
84. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. &
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (noting that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment could be used at a parole violation hearing because the deterrent effect of ap
plying the exclusionary rule would not outweigh the cost); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984).
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embody either the text of or the values underlying the Fourth
Amendment: it does not prohibit unreasonable search and seizures,
and it does not protect the privacy of the person obtaining the benefit
of the exclusion. Its purpose is purely instrumental - it is hoped that
officers will have less incentive to violate other persons' Fourth
Amendment rights in the future. Assuming some other remedy, such
as monetary damages or citizen review boards would deter as effec
tively, neither the Court nor the Constitution should prefer one over
the other.
The Court in Franks v. Delaware85 mandated a post-search hearing
to determine whether an officer was deliberately or recklessly untruth
ful in her warrant affidavit, with exclusion of evidence as the outcome.
The Court rejected "the alternative sanctions of a perjury prosecution,
administrative discipline, contempt, or a civil suit" as inadequate.86
This was an incidental right created by the Court after balancing the
time and cost of an extra proceeding against the detrimental effect on
the Fourth Amendment of providing no effective remedy when offi
cers establish probable cause by lying.
Yet another incidental right triggered by a Fourth Amendment
violation is the rule that evidence taken during a suppression motion
cannot be used by the prosecutor in her case-in-chief in the subse
quent criminal trial. Simmons v. United States87 straddles the line be
tween a prophylactic rule and an incidental right. There may or may
not be an actual Fourth Amendment violation, depending upon how
the judge rules on the suppression motion. In either case, however, the
Court has determined that allowing the government to use suppres
sion hearing testimony against a defendant during the criminal trial
puts him to an unfair choice between asserting his Fourth Amendment
right against an unreasonable search and his Fifth Amendment privi
lege against self-incrimination.
The remedy for violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment
speedy trial guarantee should have been framed as an incidental right.
In Barker v. Wingo,88 the Court instead held that the remedy of dis
missal of the indictment is "the only possible remedy." It is difficult to
understand why Justice Powell believed this to be true. The Court of
Appeals in United States v. Strunk89 offered the novel rule of subtract
ing the unjustified days of delay from the defendant's total sentence
after conviction, rather than dismissing the charge. One can imagine
85. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
86.

Id.

at 169.

87. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In this case, an alleged robber took the stand at the suppression
hearing and admitted ownership of a suitcase with incriminating evidence inside in order to
establish standing to contest the search.
88. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
89. 467 F.2d at 969 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
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equally creative remedies, such as money damages; demotion of
prosecutors involved in the case; or an instruction to the jury explain
ing that the government unreasonably delayed the trial, that this may
prejudice the defendant, and they may take this into account in ren
dering their verdict. This case was also a perfect candidate for a consti
tutional prophylactic rule. Though Justice Powell claimed that the
Court does "not establish procedural rules for the States, except when
mandated by the Constitution,"90 that, of course, is not true. This case
would have given the Court the perfect opportunity to proffer a pro
phylactic rule similar to the Federal Speedy Trial Act adopted by
Congress two years later,91 or perhaps offer defendants some new ac
tion for mandamus in federal court to require the prosecutor to move
forward in a timely manner.
The Court in Vasquez v. Hillery92 provided for the reversal of the
criminal conviction of a defendant clearly guilty of a brutal murder be
cause African Americans were systematically excluded from the grand
jury that indicted him. In fashioning the incidental right of reversal,
rather than upholding the conviction on the basis of harmless error re
view or a finding that systemic racial discrimination no longer infects
the selection of grand juries in Kings County, the Court weighed the
impossibility of retrying the defendant for a twenty-three-year-old of
fense against the seriousness of the constitutional violation and the de
sire to prevent racial discrimination in the future. The Court did con
sider alternative incidental rights, such as criminal prosecutions of
those officials that engaged in the discrimination, or a civil rights ac
tion by blacks excluded from jury service against the discriminating of
ficials, but found them inadequate to the task.93
Finally, the dismissal of an indictment94 or reversal of a conviction95
in response to a successful claim that the Equal Protection Clause was
violated by selective prosecution of a defendant because of his race,

90.

Barker, 407

U.S. at 523.

91. Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 -74, 3152-56 (1994)). See infra note 1 17 and accompanying text.
92. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
93.

See id.

at 262 n.5.

94. The Court has "never determined whether dismissal of the indictment, or some
other sanction, is the proper remedy if a court determines that a defendant has been the vic
tim of prosecution on the basis of his race." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461
n.2 (1996) (refusing to allow discovery on selective enforcement of crack cocaine law as de
fendant failed to show similarly situated white crack users who were not prosecuted); see
also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (refusing to dismiss indictment on selective
prosecutions grounds as defendant failed to show the government selected non-registrants
for prosecution on the basis of their speech).
95. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (reversing a conviction for violation of
ordinance prohibiting the construction of wooden laundries without a license because of dis
criminatory denial of licenses to individuals of Chinese origin).
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religion, ethnicity, or viewpoint is an incidental right. There is cer
tainly nothing inherently valuable in dismissing the indictments of ad
mitted drug dealers. The Court, however, demanded that some action
be taken, though it has not opined that the Constitution demands a
particular response. Perhaps a civil action for money damages, the
demotion or firing of the police officers or prosecutors involved, or a
requirement that the government prosecute similarly situated indi
viduals of other races would do as nicely.

II.

(RE)FORMULATING PROPHYLACTIC RULES, SAFE HARBORS,
AND INCIDENTAL RIGHTS

There is simply no returning to the pre-prophylactic rules and inci
dental rights days, both because the Court will not return,96 and be
cause, as a normative matter, the Court should not. The charge that
prophylactic rules and incidental rights are constitutionally illegiti
mate, because the Court has no authority to provide greater protec
tion than mandated by the federal Constitution, seems to me merely a
policy preference in favor of under-enforcement rather than over
enforcement of individual liberties. Those making this argument
against prophylactic rules and incidental rights are resoundingly quiet
about safe harbor rules, which underenforce individual liberties.
Those rules, however, are subject to a similar criticism: it is constitu
tionally illegitimate for the Court to ignore a State's violation of the
federal Constitution in a case before it. Moreover, the Court is an in
stitution that must craft rules and procedures allowing it to effectively
decide the cases before it. Finally, as I demonstrate below, there are
great advantages to utilizing prophylactic rules and incidental rights
over the alternative of core constitutional interpretation if the Court
moves carefully enough. A constitutional rule cannot be easily
changed by subsequent legislation, but a prophylactic rule or inciden
tal right can be.97 Moreover, a prophylactic rules can be used as a
technique for the Court to indicate its level of certainty regarding the
propriety of a procedure. The critical question today is how the Court
can best utilize these prophylactic rules, safe harbor rules, and rights in
a way that maximizes their benefits and minimizes their dangers.

96. Only Justices Scalia and Thomas might be willing to reverse the great quantity of
case law needed to return to those days. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
97. There may be the rare case where the Court will gradually accept a constitutional
change triggered by legislation. It seems to me, however, that there is certainly quite a dif
ferent psychological advantage in a legislature requesting that the Court modify a prophylac
tic rule rather than a constitutional interpretation.

1052

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1030

A. Fostering a Dialogue Between the Supreme Court
and Other Federal and State Actors
The primary critique of prophylactic rules one sees in the litera
ture, in addition to the Article III legitimacy critique, is that such rules
implicate federalism and national separation of powers.98 The concern
is that the Court might wield this rulemaking authority to intrude un
necessarily upon criminal law, an area traditionally left to state
authority,99 beyond what pure constitutional interpretation would
countenance. Additionally, in attempting to deter executive branch of
ficials from violating the Constitution, and in drafting many criminal
procedure rules and rights that arguably should be drafted by
Congress, prophylactic rulemaking intrudes upon the separation of
powers in the national government. I do not believe the answer to the
federalism criticism is any need for national uniformity in criminal
procedures, 100 nor do I believe that the complete answer to the separa
tion of powers argument is that vindication of constitutional rights is a
traditional function of judicial review.101 The more persuasive answer
is that nature abhors a vacuum. When the Court promulgates such
rules and rights it is not attempting to fashion uniform national rules,
nor is it jealously guarding its judicial prerogative to remedy constitu
tional wrongs. Rather, it has stepped in by necessity - when states re
fuse to act to protect the constitutional criminal procedural guarantees
in state criminal trials, 102 and when Congress and the Attorney
General fail to protect the constitutional criminal procedural guaran
tees of federal defendants.
The paradigmatic examples of the Court creating an incidental
right and prophylactic rule because of state government failure are the
Mapp and Miranda cases, respectively. The Supreme Court had no
choice but to extend the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth
Amendment to the states in 1961 because of the continued lawlessness
the country experienced during the twelve years between Wolf v.
Colorado,'°3 where the Court held that the federal exclusionary rem
edy did not apply to the states, and Mapp v. Ohio,104 where the Court
98.

See Schrock &

Welsh, supra note 7.

99. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (striking the Gun Free School
Zone Act of 1990 as beyond Congress's power pursuant to the Commerce Clause, in part
because criminal law enforcement is an area "where states historically have been sover
eign").
100. This was Professor Monaghan's response. Monaghan, supra note 5, at 18.
101. Monaghan argued this as well. Monaghan, supra note 5, at 34.
102. See, e.g. , William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights
REV. 761 (1961) (arguing for selective incorporation).
103. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
104. 367 U.S. 643 (196 1).

and the States,

36 N.Y.U. L.
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held that it did. The Court had given the states every opportunity to
act, yet state legislatures between the time of Wolf and Mapp provided
no remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, state judges and police
departments implemented no procedures to deter violations, and state
law enforcement officials never bothered to learn, much less obey, the
search and seizure rules imposed by the federal Constitution.1 05
The same is true for extending warnings regarding the Self
Incrimination Clause to the states. While federal law enforcement
agencies were routinely warning defendants of their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination,106 state police departments were
not only failing to warn but were frequently engaging in excessively
coercive interrogation techniques. 1 01
Placing this blame on state actors and other branches of the na
tional government is only part of the answer. The Court was also
forced to develop prophylactic rules in light of its own institutional
limitations. The Court could not hear a sufficient number of state con
fession cases to protect the Self-Incrimination Clause, and the Court
could not persuade state actors to learn much less follow its interpreta
tion of the Fourth Amendment. If the Court is unable to do its job
without prophylactic rules and incidental rights, it must rely on police
departments and legislatures to enact such rules, or it must fashion
them itself. When the Court generates safe harbors, it is acting from
this sort of necessity. The problem is not the state and federal officials
fail to act after a signal that the Court is unable to protect the particu
lar constitutional right at issue. Rather, the Court is responding to the
fact that its own case law is too confusing for nonlawyer police to learn
or follow, or the factual circumstances confronted by the state actors
are too varied for a standard (rather than bright-line rule) to provide
sufficient guidance. I will not include safe harbor rules as amenable to
ready modification by the other branches. The creation or modifica
tion of a safe harbor by legislative or executive actors should be
viewed by the Court with some suspicion, as such rules by definition
enlarge executive power at the expense of the Constitution.

105. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, A khil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional
Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again , " 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996); Klein, supra
note 26, at 549-50.
106. See

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (refusal to allow contact
with family); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (false representation that children
would be removed from home); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (deprivation of food, wa
ter, and sleep); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (sympathy falsely aroused); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (threat of angry mob); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944) (thirty-six hours of nonstop incommunicado interrogation); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936) (whipping of black suspect). As the Dickerson majority noted, the Court de
cided thirty confession cases between Brown in 1941 and Escobedo in 1964. Dickerson v.
United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2330 (2000). This, of course, was just the tip of the iceberg.
107. Id.; see also
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While legislative and law-enforcement failure to act and the
Court's own institutional limitations explain why the Court began cre
ating prophylactic rules, safe harbors, and incidental rights, it does not,
by itself, defeat the federalism and separation of powers criticisms.
These criticisms are answered by the fact that prophylactic rules and
incidental rights are fully open to revision by Congress, federal execu
tive action, and state legislative, executive or judicial action.108 If one
views the purposes behind federalism as the preservation of local con
trol in fields traditionally left to state government and the reform and
evolution of criminal procedures attained by experimentation, these
values should not be lost, and in fact would be advanced. While the
Court will, of course, have the final say as to whether alternative pro
phylactic rules and rights provided by legislators, law enforcement
agencies, and state judges sufficiently protect the Bill of Rights in a
manner the Court can effectively oversee, the use of prophylactic rules
and incidental rights rather than pure constitutional interpretation
gives the states exactly that opportunity for diversity and experimenta
tion. Further, it allows the other two branches of the federal govern
ment increased opportunities for participation.
There are a number of examples of the Court signaling to other
state and federal actors that a certain constitutional prophylactic rule
or constitutional incidental right was up for grabs. These have been
met with varying degrees of success. During the same term as the
Miranda decision, the Court in United States v. Wade109 instituted what
I would define as a constitutional prophylactic rule and openly invited
legislative or executive counteroffers. The Court noted that
"[l]egislative or other regulations, such as those of local police de
partments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional sug108. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), will not stand in the way of congres
sional and executive development of alternative procedures. The Court's invitation to these
actors to assist in fashioning prophylactic rules and incidental rights telegraphs the Court's
future decision as to whether the action would be congruent with, and proportional to, a
constitutional violation. See id. at 520. Though the Court has left the boundaries unclear,
prophylactic rules by Congress substituting for constitutional prophylactic rules developed
by the Court should be acceptable, as " [l)egislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional." Id. at 518.
Likewise, state attempts to fashion prophylactic rules and incidental rights should be
constitutionally acceptable; first because the Court requested these attempts; second, be
cause federalism demands that the states be granted at least as much leeway for experimen
tation as the federal government; and third, as a reflection of a state constitution which may
provide greater protection than the federal Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Gerschoffer, 738
N.E.2d 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that sobriety checkpoints permitted by the Fourth
Amendment violate the Indiana Constitution); Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared
Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2001 ) (arguing that City of
Boerne will not prohibit either federal or state alternatives to Miranda); Leigh A. Morrissey,
State Courts Reject Leon on State Constitutional Grounds: A Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47
VAND. L. REV. 917 (1994).
109. 388

U.S.

218 (1967).

Prophylactic Rules

March 2001]

1055

gestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful con
frontation at trial may also remove the basis for regarding the stage as
'critical.' " 1 10 The resulting initial dialogue between the Court and
Congress might be labeled a failure in light of the immediate congres
sional attempt to overrule Wade without eliminating the potential for
suggestive lineups,111 though the federal executive branch has stead
fastly refused to utilize that statute. On the state and local levels, how
ever, there were early attempts to institute substitute procedures,112
some effectively removing the need for counsel during those lineups.1 13
More recently, there is success at the federal level as well. Former
Attorney General Janet Reno commissioned the Technical Working
Group for Eyewitness Evidence to develop the 1999 guide for effec
tive procedures for witness identifications.114 Though no federal court
has yet opined as to whether these recommended procedures effec
tively replace the need for counsel at lineups, at least one jurisdiction
has already implemented them.115
A successful example of the dialogue and cooperation I envision is
Congress's reaction to Barker v. Wingo.116 Congress was understanda
bly unhappy with the Court's selection of dismissal of an indictment
against a quite possibly guilty defendant as a constitutional incidental
right of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee. Passage of the

1 10.

Id.

at 239.

1 1 1 . As part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 Congress en
acted not only 18 U.S.C. § 3501, attempting to repeal Miranda, but also 18 U.S.C. § 3502,
purporting to overrule Wade. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-02 (1994). This statute has, to my knowl
edge, never been used by a federal prosecutor in an attempt to admit witness testimony iden
tifying a defendant after a post-indictment lineup in the absence of counsel.
1 12. See, e.g., Frank T. Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or A voidable
Extravagance?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 339 (1969) (discussing regulations for New York City,
Oakland, California, Washington D.C, and Clark County, Nevada published as appendices);
Note, Protection of the Accused at Police Lineups, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 345 (1970)
(discussing regulations in Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Richmond, Virginia).
1 13. See, e.g., People v. Fowler, 461 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1969) (holding that detailed regula
tions for the conducting of lineups, including that two still photographs be taken of the line,
were sufficient); People v. Curtis, 497 N.E.2d 1004 (111. 1986) (holding that there is no right
to counsel if lineup photographed); Bruce v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 1978) (holding that
there is no Sixth Amendment basis for exclusion where lineup was photographed and de
fense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the officer who created the lineup). But
see United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that videotape was in
sufficient as it only showed the lineup members and did not record what occurred in the wit
ness room).
1 14. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, NAT'L
INST. JUST. (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter Eyewitness Evidence].
115. The State of New Jersey has done so, according to Deputy Attorney General Lori
Linskey. Telephone interview with Lori Linskey, Deputy Attorney General for the State of
New Jersey (Mar. 1, 2001).
1 16. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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Federal Speedy Trial Act117 immediately after and in response to
Barker offered the perfect prophylactic rule to prevent the application
of the constitutional incidental right. By forcing federal prosecutors to
try these cases in a timely manner, the Act prevents a violation of the
Sixth Amendment and the implementation of the draconian incidental
right of dismissal.
A successful example of a state response to a Court-created pro
phylactic rule is California's response to the Court's invitation in
Anders v. California118 to implement an alternative procedure to pro
tect an indigent defendant's constitutional right to appellate counsel
when his claims appear frivolous. The California Supreme Court took
up the challenge in People v. Wende,11 9 and the Court last term in
Robbins was fully satisfied with these alternative procedures.12°
There has also been some Court-Congress dialogue regarding the
constitutional incidental right of the exclusion of evidence taken in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, though unlike the two examples
noted above, no successful enactment of alternative procedures. The
exclusionary remedy has obvious disadvantages; it benefits solely
guilty persons, does nothing to safeguard the privacy rights of innocent
persons, and may create a windfall for the guilty party that is out of
proportion to the gravity of the Fourth Amendment violation and the
gravity of the defendant's crime.121 Thus, Congress proposed a bill to
replace the exclusionary remedy with a monetary damages scheme.122 I
have noted elsewhere that this proposal is clearly inadequate due to,
among other things, its low cap on monetary damages, and its ad hoc
jury verdicts rather than the written judicial opinions necessary to
guide officer conduct.123 Professor Akhil Amar has suggested a more
comprehensive set of remedies, including enterprise liability, the abo
lition of official immunities, and a sentencing discount for convicted

1 17. Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74, 3 152-56 (1994)). The Speedy Trial Act was adopted in direct re
sponse to the Supreme Court's suggestion in Barker that setting specific time limits was part
of the legislative function. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7401 , 7405 ("With respect to providing specified time periods in which a defendant must be
brought to trial, the Court in Barker . . . said . . . 'such a result would require this Court to
engage in legislative or rulemaking activity . . . . ).
'

"

1 18. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
1 19. 600 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1979).
120.

See supra

note 56.

121. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. Cr.
REV. 49; Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 363.
122.

See

H. 666 and S. 3, 104 Cong. (1995).

123.

See

Klein, supra note 26, at 549.
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defendants.124 Such a proposal may come close enough to serving the
same function as the constitutional incidental right to exclusion of evi
dence to be accepted by the Court, particularly if the civil damage
remedy were supplemented with an automatic award of attorneys fees
and the exclusion from the civil jury trial of evidence of criminality
discovered during the search.125 Moreover, we would still need some
method for imposing categorical rules that law enforcement personnel
can follow. Still, the potential for a federal or state legislatively de
signed alternative constitutional incident is possible.
One example of dismal failure of a prophylactic rule to foster a
constructive and respectful exchange between Congress and the Court
is the Miranda decision itself. The Court earnestly denied subjecting
law enforcement to a "constitutional straightjacket,'' and invited
"Congress and the States to . . . search for . . . other procedures which
are at least as effective."126 As Professor Yale Kamisar vividly de
scribed in his Cornell article last year,127 Congress enacted 18 U.S.
Code § 3501 in 1 968 not in response to this request for alternatives but
simply to overrule a decision it loathed. The Court reacted to this an
gry, disrespectful, and disingenuous attempt to overrule a constitu
tional prophylactic rule it didn't care for exactly as one would ex
pect.128 This should not be the end of the matter, however. One can
imagine numerous plausible candidates for the Court's request for
"adequate protective devices."129 Professors Amar and Lettow have
suggested questioning by a magistrate;130 I have earlier suggested pro
viding an attorney in the interrogation room;131 and scholars have long
suggested videotaping all custodial interrogations.132 A variant of
124. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997).
125. To ask a judge or jury to put out of her mind that the defendant is a criminal is to
ask too much, and has already resulted in the skewing of Fourth Amendment doctrine.
126.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

127.

Yale Kamisar, Can (Did)

(2000) .

436, 467 (1966).

Congress "Overrule"

128. See United States v. Dickerson,
statute, 7-2, as unconstitutional).
129. Miranda, 384 U.S.

120

S. Ct.

Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV.

2326 (2000)

883

(striking down the federal

at 532.

130. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Letlow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995). This was first suggested 60 years
earlier by Dean Pound. Roscoe Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected
of Crime, J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014 (1933).
131. See Klein, supra note 3.
132. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a Dis
comfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 236-43 (1977); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda
Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 681-91 (1996) (arguing that substantive due

process requires that the Court legally mandate the electronic-recording of custodial inter
rogations in all felony cases); Glanville Williams, The Authentication of Statements to the Po
lice, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 6, 7, 15.
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Professor Amar's position133 would likely achieve all three benefits of
the Court's constitutional prophylactic rule in that it would dispel the
compulsion inherent in the custodial interrogation, provide guidance
to police officers, and make it possible for the Court to rule on this is
sue. A magistrate is unlikely, however, to engage in the false sympa
thy, intimidation and fabrication necessary to obtain incriminating
statements. 1 34 Likewise, putting attorneys in the interrogation room
would fulfill all three functions of the prophylactic rule but again
would detrimentally over-protect the self incrimination privilege few attorneys would allow their clients to speak.
Videotaping confessions start to finish captures false and coerced
confessions in a way Miranda never can. Videotaping, nonetheless, is
not an alternative that adequately replaces the Miranda warnings. It
may dispel some of the compulsion inherent in a custodial setting, as
suming the defendant knows that it is recording and believes that it
cannot be tampered with later, since officers are less likely to beat
suspects on video. It offers no guidance, however, to police officers as
to what kind of conduct is permitted, and it puts the Court right back
into the same totality of circumstances boat it was drifting in prior to
Miranda. Unlike in First Amendment cases involving obscene videos,
courts will be unwilling to view hours and hours of tedious videotaped
interrogations in every case involving a statement (assuming that
judges even knew what they were looking for). They will still need
some method for narrowing the class of cases. Videotaping plus a list
of unacceptable police tactics would do nicely.
In revisiting past and developing future prophylactic rules and in
cidental rights, the dialogue I envision between the Court, Congress,
state legislators, federal and state law enforcement agencies, and state
judges should be possible if all parties act in good faith and treat each
other with respect. Perhaps I am insufficiently cynical, but I believe
such dialogue may fruitfully occur if the Court makes its invitation
genuine. It is true that neither state nor federal legislatures are trip
ping over themselves to enforce constitutional criminal procedural

133. The variant would eliminate the magistrate's contempt power to compel an answer
and replace police interrogation with magistrate interrogation rather than supplementing it.
The problem with Amar's proposal is that without the contempt club we would likely see no
confessions at all, and with the contempt club and the sworn testimony we violate the
Framers' understanding of the Fifth Amendment. This is why the number of scholars who
suggested unsworn interrogation before a magistrate years before Amar and Lettow's article
suggested that the only sanction for a suspect's refusal to comply with the magistrate was to
permit the trier of fact to consider that silence, and even that was thought to require a consti
tutional amendment for implementation. See, e.g., WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT
AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES
78 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968); Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the A ccused
- A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932).
134. See Klein, supra

note 26, at 554.
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guarantees that benefit persons suspected of crime.135 However, it is
possible that nonjudicial state and federal actors wiil create and adopt
procedures that separate the guilty from the innocent, rather than pro
cedures that separate the very guilty from the less guilty, or that pro
tect values not associated with the truth-seeking function of criminal
trials. Even the most hawkishly "tough-on-crime" legislator should
have little interest in incarcerating the innocent.136 I have also noticed
some interest by legislatures in eliminating the appearance of racism
in the criminal justice system, even when these measures do not neces
sarily separate the guilty from the innocent.137 Finally, threatened
Court action (indicating that it will generate a rule or right if another
branch fails to do so) might provide the necessary impetus. In any
case, it seems to me we have nothing to lose by giving it a try. If the
other branches fail to act, the Court can continue to fashion the pro
phylactic rules, safe harbor rules, and incidental rights it finds neces
sary. If other government actors introduce implausible alternative
procedures that will defeat constitutional rights, the Court can simply
ignore such mischievous legislative behavior or declare the alterna
tives inadequate.138
135. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1996) ("Three Strikes and You're
Out"); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44

SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 079 (1993), Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 527, 535-38 (1996) (detailing the Willie Horton fiasco).
136. Even my home state of Texas, not known for coddling criminals, is likely to enact a
bill proposed by Sen. Rodney Ellis which requires the state to fund DNA testing of arrestees
and convicted felons where appropriate. Likewise, the Department of Justice has set up
committees to examine the use of DNA to free wrongfully convicted person, and the proper
procedures to eliminate mistaken eyewitness identifications. Dep't of Just., Postconviction
DNA Testing: Recommendations for Handling Requests (Sept. 1999) (identifying 68 cases of
wrongfully convicted person exonerated by DNA evidence, and encouraging "the pursuit of
truth over the invocation of appellate time bars."); Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 1 14.
Congress is presently considering the Innocence Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4167. Many of
my suggestions for social science research in Section Il.B, infra, concern criminal procedures
that would improve accuracy.
137. See, e.g., President's Memorandum on Fairness in Law Enforcement, 35 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1067 (President William J. Clinton) (June 9, 1999) (directing federal
agencies to collect and report statistics relating to race, ethnicity, and gender for law en
forcement activities); U.S. ATI'YS MANUAL § 9-10.050 (1998) (requiring Committee ap
pointed by Attorney General to consider whether racial bias played any role in decision to
seek federal death penalty); Letter from Att'y Gen. Janet Reno and Barry McCaffery to
President Clinton (July 3, 1 997), reprinted in 10 FED. SENT. REP. 192, 193 (1998) (describing
a proposal by the Department of Justice and the Office of National Drug Control Policy to
decrease the powder to crack cocaine ratio from 100:1 to 10:1); S. 146, 106th Cong. (1 999)
(Republican bills incorporating a ten-to-one ratio); S. 5, 106th Cong. (1999) (same); H.R.
939, 1 06th Cong. (1999) (Democratic bills treating crack and powdered cocaine as equiva
lents); H.R. 1241, 106th Cong. (1999) (same); 66 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 13, (Jan. 5, 2000) (de
tailing New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman's consent decree).
138. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was properly ignored by the Department of Justice,
under both Democratic and Republican administrations, for many years. Though the
Republicans did put some of their tirades into writing, they never implemented a policy to
seek Supreme Court reversal of Miranda on this ground (though a few Assistant United

1060

Michigan Law Review
B.

[Vol. 99:1030

Fostering a Dialogue Between the Court, Empiricists,
and Social Scientists

Properly understood, a prophylactic rule or incidental right comes
into play when the Court finds that it cannot otherwise protect a par
ticular constitutional clause. · Although in such situations some pro
phylactic rule is necessary, no particular rule is required - only one
that is "effective." This permits the Court to create new prophylactic
rules and incidental rights as changed circumstances and new data
generated by social scientists mandate. It also allows the Court to
change the rules by accepting alternate rules provided by Congress,
state legislators, federal and state law enforcement agencies and state
judges, who may have better knowledge of the circumstances encoun
tered or facts on the ground, and who may be better institutionally
suited to play factfinder. Finally, labeling the procedures prophylactic
rather than true constitutional interpretation permits the Court to de
termine the occasions when the rule comes into play. For example, the
Court need not apply a prophylactic rule retroactively,139 it need not
be cognizable on habeas, 140 and it may create exceptions to the rule, if
employing the rule in those situations or without exceptions is unnec
essary or would involve unacceptable costs.
Let us examine how the Miranda exceptions are consistent with my
conception of prophylactic rules, and how social scientists might better
States Attorneys made the attempt at the lower court level). It was only after a contrivance
by a particular Assistant United States Attorney and a conservative law professor that §
3501 reared its ugly head in Dickerson.
139. See, e.g. , Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973) (refusing to apply the prophylactic
rule developed in Pearce retroactively to a case still on direct appeal); Johnson v. New Jer
sey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (holding that Miranda would not apply retroactively).
140. While the Court can also refuse to provide relief for a "true" constitutional viola
tion retroactively or on habeas, such action is more difficult to justify, particularly on the
grounds of costs. The Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) and Withrow v. Williams,
507 U.S. 680 (1 993) came pretty close to treating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
as an incidental right and the Miranda warnings as a prophylactic rule, and thus properly
analyzing whether the extension of the right or rule is necessary on habeas and explaining
the different outcomes. For example, the Powell Court noted that there is little marginal
benefit to enforcing what I call the incidental right of exclusion because it comes too late to
produce a noticeable deterrent effect. Powell, 428 U.S. at 493. Thus, under my conceptual
framework, it does not deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment nor make the de
fendant whole. Likewise, its cost is unacceptable, as the extension of the right to habeas
" 'divert[s attention) from the ultimate question of guilt,' squanders scarce federal judicial
resources, intrudes on the interest of finality, creates friction between the state and federal
systems of justice, and upsets the 'constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federal
ism is founded.' " Withrow, 507 U.S. at 701-02. In contrast, the extension of Miranda's pro
phylactic rule to habeas directly advances one of the values underlying the Self
Incrimination Clause: the exclusion of untrustworthy confessions. Moreover, the cost of the
extension is acceptable, as "eliminating review of Miranda claims would not significantly
benefit the federal courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction, or advance the cause of
federalism in any substantial way . . . [as] virtually all Miranda claims would simply be re
cast" as due process claims. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693.
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inform the Court regarding these exceptions. All but one the Miranda
exceptions can be explained by returning to my definition of a pro
phylactic rule. The explicit federal constitutional right at issue is the
privilege against self-incrimination. A constitutional prophylactic rule
is appropriate only upon two determinations: first, that providing re
lief only upon a showing that the explicit right was violated is ineffec
tive; and second, that the rule will be effective while involving only ac
ceptable costs. Providing relief only upon a showing that a statement
was compelled is ineffective; the Court was unable to determine when
the self-incrimination right was violated because of the posthoc nature
of the inquiry, because the totality of the circumstances test required
the Court to examine too many facts in too many case, and because
the j udicial results of implementing the totality of the circumstances
test provides no guidance to police officers for future conduct. I turn
now to the second showing, that the prophylactic rules is appropriate
because Miranda warnings are relatively effective in enforcing the ex
plicit constitutional right at issue, and involve only acceptable costs.
Every Supreme Court case blessing the use of statements taken in
violation of Miranda at a criminal trial except New York v. Quarles in
volved a good faith or unintentional violation of the prophylactic
rule, 141 coupled with particularly high costs for implementing the rule.
Where officers are trying to obey the dictates of Miranda, exceptions
to the prophylactic rule may be acceptable.142 An unintentional viola
tion of Miranda would be less likely to lead to a coercive interroga
tion,. and there will be so few of these that the Court will not be inun
dated with the due process totality of the circumstances claims it
sought to prevent by instituting the Miranda prophylactic rule.
On the other hand, powerful costs are associated with applying the
prophylactic rule in these cases. For example, in Harris the Court bal
anced the utility of the prophylactic rule against the serious costs of "a

141. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (noting that an unintentional depar
ture from the precise language laid out in the Miranda opinion does not render warnings
inadequate where they reasonably convey to the suspect his right to an attorney); Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 315 (1984) (noting that the officer failed to give Miranda warnings
because he was unaware that a defendant questioned in his own home was in "custody" and
that the officer's failure to Mirandize "may have been the result of confusion as to whether
the brief exchange qualified as 'custodial interrogation' "); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974) (noting that, because the questioning in Tucker occurred before Miranda was an
nounced and otherwise conducted in an objectively reasonable manner, the exclusion of the
derivative evidence solely for failure to comply with the nonexistent Miranda requirement
would not significantly deter Miranda violations); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
(noting that the interrogation in Harris took place on January 7, 1966, about six months be
fore Miranda was handed down on June 13, 1966).
142. I believe this position is consistent with my suggestion in an earlier article that a
deliberate Miranda violation constitute a proper basis for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See
Klein, supra note 3.
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license to use perjury by way of a defense."143 In Michigan v. Tucker,144
the Court balanced the unintentional Miranda violation against a liv
ing individual witness's voluntary decision to testify.145 In Elstad the
Court weighed the unintentional failure to warn against the value to
the truth seeking function of the trial of admitting a fully voluntary
statement attenuated by time and an adequate Miranda warning from
the initial statement in violation of the prophylactic rule.146
The case of New York v. Quarles,147 where the police intentionally
refused to Mirandize a suspect because they believed that public
safety demanded the information they sought, raises more difficult is
sues. One could justify it on the grounds that the Fifth Amendment
itself must yield to public safety issues. No constitutional right is ab
solute, and one could plausibly argue if a suspect refused to reveal
where he had planted a bomb in the schoolyard the Constitution might
tolerate some level of coercion to compel the defendant to reveal its
location.148 Even in the absence of a public safety exception to the
Fifth Amendment, a single exception allowing an intentional Miranda
violation will not negate the effectiveness of the rule.149 In the vast
majority of instances, officers will continue to give the Miranda warn
ings because no public safety issue looms, and they know they will lose
the statement without the warnings. Where danger to the community
(like the loaded gun lying unprotected in an open supermarket in
Quarles) is imminent, it seems to me the officers are going to ask ques
tions without Mirandizing regardless of whether this triggers the pro-

143. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). However, Harris was informed of his
right to remain silent, and the assistant district attorney questioning Harris asked Harris if he
wanted to speak to an attorney at that time; Harris said that he would "call tomorrow" and
then answered several questions, the answers to which were used to impeach him at trial. See
People v. Harris, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). For a scathing criticism, see
Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1 1 98 (1971).
144. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
145. Id. ; see also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277 (1978) (refusing to exclude
testimony of live witness).
146. "Nor did the officers exploit the unwarned admission to pressure respondent into
waiving his right to remain silent." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316.
1 47. 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (holding 5-4 that the public safety exception to Miranda allows
admission of statement in case-in-chief).
148. Just as one does not have a First Amendment free speech right to yell "fire" in a
crowded movie theater. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
149. See, e.g. , United States v. Colon-Osorio, 877 F. Supp. 771 (D. Puerto Rico 1994)
(no public safety exception where officers see gun); Fleming v. Collins, 954 F. 2d 1 109 (5th
Cir. 1 992) (en bane) (public safety exception applied where officers asked bank robber who
shot guard "where is the gun?"). But see United States v. Edwards, 885 F. 2d 377 (7th Cir.
1989) (exception applied where officer asked drug sale arrestee whether he had a gun).
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phylactic rule requiring exclusion. As with Terry frisks,150 safety will
seem more important and certainly more immediate than the future
result of a suppression hearing.
If the other exceptions to Miranda, however, are permitted after
intentional Miranda violations, the Court risks turning the exclusion of
evidence in a prosecutor's case-in-chief for a Miranda violation from a
sanction for misconduct into a price well worth paying in exchange for
the derivative and impeachment evidence obtained.151 At that point
the exceptions have swallowed up the rule; the rule no longer enforces
the explicit federal constitutional right - here the protection against
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination - and it no longer
guides officers' conduct. Should the rule become ineffective in this
manner, the Court would regress to deciding each case based on the
totality of the circumstances - exactly what it was trying to avoid by
crafting the prophylactic rule in the first place. To determine whether
this is occurring, the Court should examine social science scholarship,
such as Charles Weisselberg's study of California's law enforcement
practices regarding interrogation,152 and reach its best guess on the
question of whether, as an empirical matter, Miranda is being ignored
often enough that it fails to function as a prophylactic rule. If the
Court determines that the exceptions encourage violations of the rule,
it may limit these exceptions to unintentional violations, and apply the
per se exclusion to all uses of evidence obtained by intentional viola
tions.153
Greater interaction between the Court and social scientists would
be useful not only in determining when to carve out exceptions to a
prophylactic rule, but in modifying existing prophylactic rules and in
cidental rights or formulating new ones.154 One prime candidate for a
150. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting brief detention without warrant based
upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, permitting frisk without warrant based upon
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous).
151. See Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty for Exclusion - A Price or Sanction?, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1275 (2000) (discussing the Fourth Amendment exclusionary sanction); Klein,
supra note 3 (discussing exceptions to Miranda).
152. Charles D . Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998) (citing
numerous examples); Charles D. Weisselberg,, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1063 (2001) (examining police training on Miranda's exceptions in Califor
nia); see also Klein, supra note 3 (recognizing this problem for the first time).
153. Lower courts have generally been utilizing the Court's exceptions for unintentional
violations even for intentional ones, without noticing the difference or doing any kind of
analysis on the effect of such widespread application of the exceptions. See, e.g. , People v.
Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998) (holding that statements taken
after deliberate Miranda violations may still be used to impeach a testifying defendant). But
see United States v. Orso, 234 F. 3d 436 (9th Cir. 2000).
154. Safe harbor rules might also be modified based upon empirical data. Consider, for
example, the Court's per se rule regarding searches of the passenger compartment of an
automobile made incident to an arrest. Suppose a well-designed empirical study in a number
of locales revealed that weapons or evidence of the crime were found during these searches
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new prophylactic rule would be procedures to protect a defendant's
right to a fair trial in light of the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.
While social science now establishes that human memory will mistake
a later-seen picture for an original incident,155 that witness confidence
is weakly related to accuracy, and that cross-racial identifications are
particularly unreliable,156 the jury will never learn this.157 An increasing
number of studies have shown misidentification to be one of the most
frequent causes of the conviction of the innocent.158 By one estimate,
there are 5,000 erroneous convictions per year due to eyewitness misin less than one-half of one percent of the cases. Alternatively, suppose the study concluded
that officers were more likely to be injured by searching in the field rather than arresting the
defendant and allowing his friend to depart with the car. The Court might change this par
ticular safe harbor rule, as a bright line rule may no longer be necessary to protect the officer
or ensure against the destruction of evidence. It may instead make sense to institute a rebut
table presumption against searching the passenger compartment of an automobile unless the
officer can articulate a reason for the search, or demonstrate the safety of such a search.
155. See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler et al., Jury Sensitivity to Eye Witness Identification
Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1990); Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on
Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013
(1995) (offering a scientific explanation of why eyewitness identification is often inaccurate);
Michael M. Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at
Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585 (1989) (listing many sociologi
cal and psychological studies documenting the problem of eye witness identification).
156. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984); Daniel Levin, Race as a Visual Feature, 129 J. EXPER. PYSCH.:
GENERAL 559 (2000).
157. While some federal and state courts give cautionary instructions, see, e.g. , Jones v.
Smith, 772 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1985); People v. Wright, 729 P.2d 280 (Cal. 1987), many leave
it to the trial judge's discretion or consider it inappropriate, see, e.g. , United States v. Tipton,
11 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 1993); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1 168 (Mass. 1995). Moreo
ver, such jury instructions do not reveal the social science data; rather, they merely inform
the jury that identification testimony depends upon the opportunity of the witness to ob
serve and may have been influenced by the circumstances of the identification. The weight
of authority disallows expert testimony of misidentification, on the grounds that the subject
matter is not beyond the ken of the average layperson, or would have undue influence upon
the jury. See, e.g. , United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1992); Rodriguez v. Com
monwealth, 455 S.E.2d 724 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
158. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) (documenting 17 cases in the 1970s and 1980s in
which convicted capital murder defendants were subsequently shown to be probably inno
cent); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317 (1997) (providing a lengthy and shocking
review of studies documenting erroneous convictions, some resulting in execution of prison
ers, some resulting in release); Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by
Science: Case Studies in the use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial, Nat'!
Inst. of Just., U.S. Dep't of Just. (1996) (report of 28 defendants improperly convicted on the
basis of inaccurate eye witness testimony later exonerated by DNA evidence); Nat'!
Comm'n on the Future of DNA Evidence, U.S. Dep't of Just., Recommendations for Han
dling Requests, (1999) (finding 40 additional cases of convicted defendants exonerated by
DNA); 1 1(10) BNA CRIM. PRACTICE MANUAL 184 (May 7, 1997) (noting the DNA testing
done by the FBI for state and local labs from 1989 to 1996 positively excluded 25 to 27 per
cent of the defendants tested); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Wit
ness, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHA v. 241, 243 (1986) (estimating that one-half of wrongful convic
tions are due to misidentification).
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identification.159 The best candidate for countering these injustices is a
new rule and/or an alternative to the right to counsel prophylactic rule
imposed by Wade160 that would require proper procedures and guide
lines for lineups, showups, and photo arrays.161 Because suggestive
lineups lead to mistaken identifications and cause high witness cer
tainty, because juries believe confident eyewitnesses, and because an
attorney can do little at the actual line-up to cure the suggestion or
later on cross-examination to shake this strongly held but erroneous
belief,162 a proper lineup beats the right to counsel at lineup (at least
for an innocent defendant) hands-down. Other plausible candidates
for such an alternative to Wade's prophylactic rule include cautionary
jury instructions163 and expert testimony164 though these devices miti
gate rather than prevent the damage.
An area ripe for additional incidental rights is the selective prose
cution doctrine. Sufficient social science and empirical data support
the proposition that blacks suffer from racial profiling in detentions
and arrests,165 much higher rates of criminal prosecution, and signifi159.

See

BRIAN CUTLER & STEVEN PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION (1995).

160. Solely as an alternative to the counsel provided by Wade, this procedure would
solve only a small part of the problem. In the wake of Wade, police departments engage in
line-ups pre-formal charge, see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), and conduct photo ar
rays post-formal charge, see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). Were this new proce
dure to apply to all witness confrontations, life or picture, pre- or post-indictment, such a
procedure would be vastly superior to the right to counsel offered in Wade. Counsel at a
lineup has no authority to object to suggestive procedures, and if he sees any, he must with
draw as counsel to become a witness for his former client. More importantly, once the wit
ness makes an erroneous identification based upon a suggestive identification procedure, it
becomes ingrained in her mind. An ounce of prevention in terms of proper procedures that
prevent false positives is worth a pound of cure in the form of exclusion of the out-of-court
(but rarely the in-court) identification.
161. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, Recommenda
tions for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., No. 6, at 1 (1998) (making
four recommendations: (1) that the lineup or photo array be conducted by officer who is un
aware of the identity of the suspect, (2) that the eyewitness be told that the culprit might not
be in the lineup or photo array, (3) that the suspect should not stand out in the lineup or
photo array, and (4) that a confidence statement should be taken from the eyewitness at the
time of the identification).
162. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7.l(a)-(e) (2d
ed. 1999).
163.

See, e.g.,

Hoffheimer, supra note 155 (suggesting special jury instructions).

164.

See, e.g., Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to the Jury in
Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93 (1992) (advocating the use of expert wit

nesses to explain the unreliability of eyewitness testimony to juries).
165. See, e.g., David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997)
(describing racially-based stops in by the Sheriffs Dept. in Volusia County, Florida; the
Maryland State Police; the Bureau County, Illinois Police Dept.; and the Sheriff's Dept. in
Eagle County, Colorado, resulting in civil rights lawsuits); Civil Rights Bureau, Off. of the
Att'y Gen., The New York City Police Department 's "Stop & Frisk " Practice: A Report from
the Office of the Attorney General (Dec. 1 , 1 999) (collecting racial breakdown on stops and
frisks).
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cantly harsher sentences than whites,166 that the Court should accept a
legislatively imposed evidentiary presumption of selective prosecution
based solely on a showing of disparate impact. This new prophylactic
rule would replace the Court requirement, from United States v.
Armstrong,167 that a defendant is not entitled to discovery on his selec
tive prosecution claim without establishing similarly-situated white in
dividuals who were not prosecuted, a standard nearly impossible for a
defendant to meet.
I am not suggesting here that the Court use social science and em
pirical data to discover the constitutional norm or value underlying a
particular clause, nor to develop the constitutional rule itself.168
Rather, I am suggesting that regardless of the method of constitutional
interpretation used to develop the constitutional norm (be it Framers'
intent, textualism, a balancing of interest approach, individual rights
based liberalism, or anything else), social science and empirical data
can assist the Court in developing the subsidiary rules and rights nec
essary to protect that norm, value, or rule. Thus I agree wholeheart
edly with the claims by Professors Merritt169 and Rubin170 that the util166. See, e.g., David
1 283 (1995) (noting that

Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV.
punishment for crack cocaine, favored by black Americans, is 100
times more severe than punishment for powder cocaine, the form enjoyed by middle-class
whites); Richard C. Dieter, The Death Penalty in Black and White: Who Lives, Who Dies,
and Who Decides, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C. (1998) (noting that blacks in
Philadelphia are four times more likely to receive a death sentence than whites, and that
100% of inmates on death row in Kentucky murdered white victims, despite fact that over
1 ,000 blacks became murder victims during the same time period); Marc Mauer & Tracy
Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice System: Five Years Later, The
Sentencing Project, Washington, D.C. (1995) (reporting that a twenty- to twenty-nine-year
old African-American male had a 30.2% chance of being under criminal justice control on
any given day of 1994).
167. See

discussion supra note 94.

Commentators calling for the use of social science research in constitutional deci
sionmaking include Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Forward: Transparent
A djudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 736 (2000) ("Theoretical principles cannot properly resolve diffi
cult criminal procedure cases without the assistance of empirical evidence"); Michael C.
Dorf, Forward: The Limits ofSocratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998) (suggesting
that the Court should consider the social consequences of its decision); David L. Faigman,
168.

"Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 612 (1991) (opining that the "Court's
empirical myopia" undermines its legitimacy); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional
Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (suggesting weakness in constitutional decisions is not

lack of theory but inattention to empirical evidence).
169. See, e.g., Deborah Jones
Chief Judge Posner, 97 MICH. L.

Merritt, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to
REV. 1287 (1999) (suggesting that empirical exploration
unmasks constitutional theory, social science discoveries can influence and inform the sub
stance of constitutional theory, and social science can stimulate a dialogue between legal
academics and social researchers); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Future of Bakke: Will Social
Science Matter?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055 (1998).
170. See, e.g.,
521.

Edward J. Rubin,

Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997

WIS. L. REV.
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ity of social science is limited to informing legal decisionmaking, not
determining the content of legal doctrine or constitutional theory. The
Court must first have a theory of what the explicitly constitutional
clause is about, and must be able to articulate why, due to its own in
stitutional limitations or the limitations of others, the prophylactic rule
or incidental right is necessary to protect the explicit constitutional
clause. Once the Court develops its theory and articulates its limita
tions, however, designing any necessary prophylactic rule, safe harbor,
or incidental right can be informed and assisted by social science re
search. The great advantage of using modifications of prophylactic
rules and incidental rights to reflect changes in data and circumstance
is that we shore up the constitutional value without tarnishing the con
stitution itself with inconsistent decisions and frequent reversals.
Undeniably, the use of empiricism and social science data by the
Court is risky, even in the more limited manner I propose. The Court
often does a bad job of evaluating the data, as it did when it turned to
social science to determine whether a six-member jury functioned in
the same manner as the twelve-member one.171 Moreover, there is
quite a bit of unreliable junk science and advocacy statistics out
there.172 Finally, social scientists also tend to give different answers to
the same questions, depending upon when they are asked.173
One answer to this criticism that the Court is not particularly good
at factfinding is that the Court is going to utilize social science data
anyway, even in explicit constitutional interpretation,174 and at least
prophylactic rules and incidental rights are more easily modified.175 A

171. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The Court's dismal performance in this
case was chronicled by Michael J. Saks, Ignorance ofScience is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec.
1974 at 18. The Court seemed to regret this case when it came to a different conclusion in
evaluating the constitutionality of five member juries in criminal trials. See Ballew v. Geor
gia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
172. See, e.g. , Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1988).
173. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (examining social science literature
documenting the effects of segregation), and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 ( 1996)
(holding that gender-based admission to VMI violates Equal Protection, and is not cured by
separate leadership program for women) are recent examples where the Court got it right.
The sociological and psychological theories at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), though not explicitly recognized in the opinion, taught that the law was incapable of
restructuring racial instincts. See generally PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972).
174. See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (1998) (detailing citations of social science data in 1 9
of the 35 cases studied in areas of sex discrimination and abortion rights cases before the
Court between 1972 and 1992); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1990) (identifying Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
( 1908) as the Court's first use of social science data).
175. Another answer suggested by a colleague is to allow the Court to hire its own ex
perts and commission studies, as was done in West Germany. See Hans W. Baade, Social
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better answer is that the kind of empirical and social science data
needed to determine when a prophylactic rule is needed, when to cre
ate exceptions, and when to jettison or change the rule should in fact
come from the legislative branches of the state and federal govern
ments. A legislature arguably has superior factfinding abilities,176 and
can consider the whole range of possible cases, whereas the Court
must consider one case at a time. I agree that bowing to legislative and
executive findings of facts is preferable. The Court's prophylactic rules
and incidental rights should be viewed as last-resort and stop-gap
measures easily replaceable by other federal and state actors.
C.

Caution, Deference, and Truth-in-Labeling

The system I have suggested will reap all of the benefits of pro
phylactic rules, safe harbors, and incidental rights and escape most of
the pitfalls only if the Court is cautious in creating the rules and rights,
deferential in accepting alternative rules and rights offered by other
branches of the federal government and by state actors, and clear in
identifying procedures as entailing prophylactic rules or incidental
rights fully open to revision (or safe harbors presumptively not open
to revision). Caution requires that the Court generate prophylactic
rules and incidental rights only when absolutely necessary. Moreover,
before acting the Court should clearly warn the other branches of the
federal and state governments in the appropriate cases that they must
act to prevent a Court-imposed rule or right. This warning should be
coupled with patience, such that action is taken only after long-term
failure by the coequal branches.177
Appropriate deference suggests that the Court accept alternative
rules and rights proposed by other federal and state actors if they can
plausibly be characterized as effective. As previously noted, the Court
reasonably accepted California's alternative approach to frivolous ap
peals in Robbins,178 and correctly rejected a clearly inadequate alterna
tive to the Miranda warnings in Dickerson.179 The Court should ex
amine proposed prophylactic rules with the goal of protecting the
constitutional clause at issue with the smallest amount of overprotec
tion possible, and examine safe harbor rules with the goal of easing

Science Evidence and the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany,

23 J. POL. 421

(1961).
176. On the other hand, one could as plausibly argue that the superior factfinding abili
ties of legislators is mostly a myth, and that social science in the hands of Congressmen is
pure advocacy.
177. Examples of cases where the Court was forced to act are Mapp
notes 104-107 and accompanying text.

Miranda v. Arizona, discussed supra

178.

See supra

note 56.

179.

See supra

note 128.

v. Ohio

and

·
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adjudication of the constitutional clause at issue with the smallest
amount of underprotection. The deference accorded a legislative or
executive branch-designed prophylactic rule or incidental right that
constrains those branch actors and overprotect the Constitution
should not be afforded to legislative or executive-branch attempt to
create a safe harbor rule that allows those branch actors to violate the
federal constitution. Permitting a state or federal actor to bind itself to
procedures that are in individual cases more stringent than what the
federal constitution demands will not be subject to the abuse that we
might see if we allow federal and state actors to exempt themselves
from the federal Constitution via safe harbor rules. The political pres
sure to create rules which make law enforcement more effective at the
expense of individual liberties will be intense.
One difficulty with expecting other branches to ignore Court
created rules and rights in favor of alternative ones is that Article III
does not permit federal courts to issue advisory opinions.180 State and
federal actors will not always be able to predict whether a particular
substitute prophylactic rule or incidental right will be deemed ade
quate by the Court. A state may be leery of trying a new procedure
with a serious criminal, who may not be chargeable or who may be
released if the prophylactic rule or incidental right was not "adequate"
or "effective" in the Court's judgment. One answer is to use the pro
cedure or right first in a misdemeanor trial as a test case. That will not
always be possible, as once a statute is enacted (if that is the form of a
particular rule) is it out of the legislature's control, and it may take
many years for a test case to wend its way to the Court. Another
method of encouraging innovation by the other branches is for the
Court to strike down an inadequate rule or right prospectively only,
preserving not only final convictions obtained pursuant to that dis
carded rule or right, but preserving all cases where an official actor re
lied upon the discarded rule or right up to the date it was stricken.181
Additionally, to preserve the particular conviction at bar, the Court
might craft some form of good faith exception to uphold criminal con
victions in spite of what the Court declares to be an inadequate rule or
right and therefore a constitutional violation.182
180. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also PAUL BATOR ET. AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-66 (2d ed. 1973); Nashville, Cincinnati v. St. Louis Railway
v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933) (holding that declaratory judgment procedures do not consti
tute advisory opinions and are constitutional). This problem will not arise when a legislature
or law enforcement agency creates a new prophylactic rule or incidental right rather than a
substitute one.
181. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 458 n.4 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting that "[t]he trend of our decisions since Johnson has thus been toward placing in
creased emphasis upon the point at which law enforcement personnel initially relied upon
the discarded constitutional standards").
182. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (admitting evidence taken in
violation of the Fourth Amendment where officer reasonably relied in good faith on an in-
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Finally, the Court must practice what I call truth-in-labeling. The
dialogue, experimentation, and responsiveness to social science and
empirical data I envision cannot occur if prophylactic rules and inci
dental rights are unrecognized as such. This candor is further neces
sary to defeat two potential problems with my conceptual framework:
rules and rights might mutate into pure constitutional interpretation;
and prophylactic rules may become a substitute for rather than a pro
tector of the constitutional norm. For example, what I thought at one
time was a benefit of Miranda - its symbolic value - may be viewed
as a detriment. The Dickerson Court, in refusing to label the Miranda
warnings either a prophylactic rule or pure constitutional interpreta
tion, noted that it has "become embedded in routine police practice to
the point where the warnings have become part of our national cul
ture. "183 Hardening a prophylactic rule into a constitutional command
would defeat one of its primary advantages - it can be modified by
the Court without spending the institutional capital necessary for a
constitutional reversals, and it can be modified by other branch actors
as better alternatives arise. As there is probably no single criminal
procedure case as famous as Miranda, I believe few run-of-the-mill
prophylactic rules or incidental rights will suffer such a fate. More
over, such transformation is not necessarily a disadvantage, so long as
the transformation is recognized and acknowledged by all actors.
The second problem is trickier. It does appear to me that some
lower courts have used the Miranda warnings as a substitute for the
required constitutional analysis a court must undertake before admit
ting any confession or statement regardless of whether the defendant
was Mirandized - a finding that the statement was given voluntar
ily.184 In other words, the litigation focus on whether the prophylactic
procedure was followed may deflect attention away from the core con
stitutional value at issue, rather than shining light upon it. My concep
tual framework will not function successfully unless the Court first
clearly explains to other federal and state actors the value underlying
each constitutional clause, and then indicates precisely what it is at
tempting to accomplish in suggesting or promulgating the rule or right.

valid search warrant); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (admitting marijuana taken dur
ing search incident to an arrest where officers reasonably and in good faith relied upon an
arrest warrant erroneously listed in a court computer record).
183. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
1 84. Several commentators have noticed that as long as Miranda is followed, lower
courts do not inquire into the voluntariness of the resulting confession. See, e.g. , Alfredo
Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was it Overruled, Or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461,
499-502 (1998), Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problems of False Confessions, in THE
MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE AND POLICING 276-77 (Richard A. Leo & George c.
Thomas III eds., 1 998).
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III. THE COURT'S FAILURES IN DICKERSON V. UNITED STA TES
The Court did none of these things in Dickerson. This opinion was,
in a word, terrible. The Court, when squarely faced with the issue of
whether the four Miranda warnings were required by the federal con
stitution, not only refused to answer coherently, but breached its duty
to provide a justification for Miranda or Dickerson and squandered an
opportunity to rationalize contradictory case law regarding Miranda's
exceptions. It could have written a well-reasoned decision either over
turning Miranda (cheered by the naive right), reconstitutionalizing
Miranda and reversing Miranda's exceptions (cheered by the naive
left), or affirming Miranda and justifying Miranda's exceptions by ac
knowledging Miranda as a prophylactic rule, as I have suggested in
Parts I and II of this essay (cheered by the center, as this maintains the
current regulation of police questioning but holds out the promise of
alternative procedures that might be an improvement). Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejects all three of these options and, in an apparent com
promise between the right and left wings of the Court, holds by judi
cial fiat that the law is to stay exactly as it was pre-Dickerson. While
this is ostensibly a victory for the liberal wing of the Court, because
Miranda is relatively ineffective at dispelling coercion, and because
Dickerson forecloses any opportunity for improvement in protecting
the privilege against self-incrimination, the decision is, in fact, a boon
for those, like Chief Justice Rehnquist, far to the right of center.185
As Professor Schulhofer demonstrated in this Symposium,186 a
Court decision to reconstitutionalize Miranda could be easily justified
and convincingly written. The Court need only have stated that all
statements taken during custodial interrogation in the absence of
Miranda warnings are always "compelled" within in the meaning of
185. Professor William J. Stuntz argues as much in this Symposium. William J. Stuntz,
Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975 (2001). A number of scholars, myself included,
noticed this prior to Dickerson. See, e.g., DA YID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE
KILLING STREETS 199 (1991) (noting that if the "intent of the Miranda decision was, in fact,
an attempt to 'dispel the compelling atmosphere' of an interrogation, then it failed misera
bly"); Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 375 (1997) (suggesting
that the warnings do not provide much protection against police pressure); Laurence A.
Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical
Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1988) (noting that Miranda was, in fact, quite a retreat
from the counsel required during custodial interrogations implied by Escobedo); Klein, su
pra note 3, at 424 ("[T)he Miranda decision is best viewed as a compromise between com
peting interests."); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law
or Judicial Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1986) (suggesting that Miranda favored law enforce
ment).
186. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth
99 MICH. L. REV. 941 (2001); see also Michigari v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good
for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987); Schulhofer,
supra note 53; Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 1 (1986).
Amendment Exceptionalism,
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the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, exactly as are
statements taken after an employer's threat to discharge a public em
ployee, 187 and statements taken after a judge's threat to impose crimi
nal contempt proceedings.188 Since compelled statements are inadmis
sible in a criminal trial for any purpose without exception,189 such a
holding would require the Court to reverse all of those cases permit
ting the introduction of statements taken in violation of Miranda for
impeachment, to rebut the insanity defense, to develop new leads, and
to use at sentencing, as those cases were based on the now erroneous
premise that the Miranda warnings were "not themselves rights pro
tected by the Constitution."190
As a second option, the Dickerson Court could have reversed
Miranda and admitting it had been deconstitutionalized by subsequent
decisions. Though I believe such a holding would have been wrong,
this is a defensible position which resulted in a plausible dissent.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that since a viola
tion of Miranda does not itself offend the Fifth Amendment, the
Court has no power to reverse state convictions based upon Miranda
violations. Miranda's exceptions obviously become unnecessary, and
contradictory case law regarding Miranda's status is resolved. A model
opinion reversing Miranda would also have contained an explanation
of why prophylactic rules are unconstitutional (though at least Justice
Scalia acknowledged the issue), and might eventually lead to the re
versal of these many prophylactic rules in constitutional criminal pro
cedure.
Unwilling either to constitutionalize or to reverse Miranda, the
Dickerson majority asserted that the Miranda doctrine has "constitu
tional underpinnings,"191 yet at the same time "the disadvantage of the

187. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (holding that a statement given by
police officers in response to the threat of removal from office if they asserted their privilege
may not be used against them in subsequent criminal trial); see also Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
188. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Additionally, the Court has held
it always constitutes compulsion to speak (and therefore a violation of the privilege) for the
prosecutor or judge to comment adversely on the defendant's silence. See Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
189. See, e.g., Portash v. New Jersey, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (distinguishing Harris and
holding that statements compelled during grand j ury proceeding by threat of criminal con
tempt cannot be used for impeachment in a later criminal case). The Court never asks, for
example, whether a particular public employee was "actually" compelled to make a state
ment upon threat of discharge or whether the statement was instead voluntary in some
sense. And the Court never asks whether a defendant might have chosen not to take the
stand despite a prosecutor's comment on the invocation of his right. Once the Court deter
mines that statements were taken under those circumstances, they are always excluded.
190. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). Such a holding would also bar the
admittance of the "fruits" of compelled statements.
191. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2334 n.5 (2000).
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Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means involun
tary. . . may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as
a result."192 If the rule is in fact broader than the Fifth Amendment,
Chief Justice Rehnquist ought to justify reversing a state criminal con
viction based upon the state court admitting a statement that did not
violate the privilege against Self-Incrimination. If the rule is a constitu
tional one, Chief Justice Rehnquist ought to explain the exceptions
admitting evidence taken in violation of the constitution.193 Instead, in
his non-answer to the question of why the traditional fruits doctrine
developed in Fourth Amendment cases does not apply to Miranda
violations, the Chief Justice stated "that unreasonable searches under
the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation
under the Fifth Amendment."194 This comes dangerously close to be
ing a non sequitur.195 How are they different, why are they different,
and how does the Court justify refusing to apply the fruits doctrine to
what we now know is a real Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Cause violation?
The Court could have answered these question by choosing a third
option, writing a convincing opinion justifying constitutional prophy
lactic rules, safe harbors, and incidental rights in criminal procedure in
general and for the Miranda decision in particular. Acknowledging
Miranda as a prophylactic rule would encourage the Court to be more
careful and explicit in identifying the factual bases for this rule. This
would in turn encourage more effective research regarding those bases
and thus more informed development of the rule (and its exceptions)
and whether to retain or modify it. From this perspective, Dickerson
not only falls far short but in fact goes in the wrong direction. We lose
not only the opportunity to discover whether the Miranda warnings
are working, but, if Dickerson portends things to come, we may suffer
this same loss with regard to the other prophylactic rules and inciden
tal rights.
An ideal opinion under my conceptual framework would have
done the following. First, the Court would have told us exactly what
the privilege against self-incrimination requires, before determining
whether we still need Miranda's prophylactic rule to effectively pre-

192.

Id.

at 2336.

193. See, e.g. , id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (castigating the majority for refusing to
bring Dickerson into the "mainstream of legal reasoning" by holding that a custodial inter
rogation not proceeded by the Miranda warnings violates the Constitution).
194.

Id.

at 2335.

195. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, since it not clear on the face of the
Fourth Amendment that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be
excluded from trial, whereas it is clear from the face of the Fifth Amendment that compelled
confessions must be excluded, if anything the argument for excluding fruits of Self
I ncrimination Clause violations is considerably stronger.
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serve and adjudicate that privilege. That it prohibits a "compelled"1 96
statement, or one given after the defendant's "will was overborne"197 is
insufficient. In contrast to the per se rules the Court has given us on
being fired from a government job, use of a subpoena, comment upon
a defendant's silence, and threat of contempt, all of which constitute
compulsion in every case,198 the Court has never well defined these
terms in the context of police interrogation, custodial or otherwise.
Without a definition of "compulsion," we cannot know when it is
"dispelled," much less what procedures are adequate to dispel it.
Every interrogation involves some amount of pressure to talk, how
much pressure is too much, and what kinds of pressure are accept
able? Is an admission influenced by a misunderstanding of the law de
fining criminal responsibility (the felony murder rule for example) in
voluntary? Is an admission influenced by the anxiety generated by
hostile police officers involuntary? It seems likely to me that as a
philosophical matter, defining voluntariness is inherently impossible.199
Even accepting the notion of free will, there is no objective baseline
for what types of pressure are "coercive," that term is a moral judg
ment about what kinds of conduct are tolerated and what kinds are
wrongful. Perhaps either the present due process totality of the cir-

196. See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945); see also Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
197. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Haynes v. Washing
ton, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Bram v. United States,
168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding that the confession must be free and voluntary). The terms
"compelled" and "involuntary" are used interchangeably by the Court. See Lawrence Her
man, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self
Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part II) , 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1992);
Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part /), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 551
(1992). But see Schulhofer, supra note 53 (advocating separate analyses and separate tests
for the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause).
198.

See cases

cited supra notes 187-189.

199. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 957
(1997) (suggesting that country lawyers, often better philosophers than philosophers are,
know that the term "coercion" cannot be defined); Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary "
Confession? Some Comments on lnbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions,
17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 747 (1963) ("To call the 'voluntariness' terminology loose and un
revealing is not the worst that can be said for it. It can also be downright misleading."); Louis
Michael Seidman, Rubashov 's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced
Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149 (1990) (arguing against social constructionist view
on grounds that actor may have no preferences independent of social interaction); George
C. Thomas III, A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 79 (1993) (outlining four theories of coercion: empirical, normative, positive lib
erty. and social constructionist); George C. Thomas III, Miranda: The Crime, the Man, and
the Law of Confessions, in MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE AND POLICING 7 ( Richard A.
Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1 998) (suggesting that defining voluntariness is "a philo
sophical or psychological problem of the first magnitude").
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cumstances test200 or a set of per se prohibitions on certain police prac
tices we find morally offensive201 is the best Court can do.
Second, the Court should have reiterated the bases for Miranda's
prophylactic rule and used the available empirical data and social sci
ence research to support the proposition that these bases are still fur
thered by the rule. The Court appears to believe that the Miranda re
quirements are designed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
interrogations and assure that such compelled statements do not influ
ence the determination of the defendant's guilt; to ease the Court's
adjudication as to whether particular confessions were compelled; and
to guide officers in conducting custodial interrogations.202 The
Miranda warnings are then a supplement to the due process totality of
circumstances test, in that they make any resulting statement more
likely to be actually voluntary, give the Court one more factor to
weigh on the voluntary side of the scale when it must decide whether
to admit the statement, and provide a procedure for all officers to fol
low. Arguably, there is more and better information available at the
time of Dickerson to determine how well the Miranda prophylactic
rule works. To determine whether Miranda is working, the Court
should have examined empirical data as to whether defendant's are
now confessing "voluntarily" as opposed to "involuntarily." This, of
course, would have required a definition of compulsion or when the
will is overborne. To be fair to the Court, even if we had such a defini
tion, social science research has provided little information as to why
defendants' make pre- or post-Miranda incriminating statements.
Richard Leo's work comes the closest,203 though he focuses more on
what the interrogating officers did and how the defendants responded

200. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (the totality of the circumstances test examines
"both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation").
201. See infra note 205.

If the Court were to decide that the warnings, instead of or in addition to dispelling
compulsion, are designed to reduce the number of false confessions, it should examine the
empirical data on such confessions to see if the warnings are effective. If Miranda is under
protective, new prophylactic rules may be designed that prohibit those tactics likely to pro
duce a false confession from an innocent suspect. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Richard J.
Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998)
(detailing specific instances of false confessions); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The
Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DEN Y. U. L. REV. 979
(1997); Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001) (suggesting limits on threats of punishment, promises of leniency,
threats of adverse consequences to loved ones, and misrepresenting the evidence, as these
tend to produce false or untrustworthy confessions).
202.

203. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interro
gators' Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda," 84 MINN. L. REV. 397
(1999); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266
(1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside Interrogation].
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and not directly on why the suspects confessed.204 Designing a study to
isolate why defendants confess would be incredibly difficult, and may
have led an honest Court to develop a new set of prophylactic rules
that focus entirely on the objective behavior of officers, outlawing
those forms of interrogation likely to induce a rationale person not in
clined to confess to do so nonetheless, or simply outlawing those prac
tices it finds particularly offensive.205
Finally, had the Dickerson Court both followed my approach and
been entirely frank, it might have admitted that Miranda's prophylac
tic rule post-Dickerson is different from the prophylactic rule origi
nally created in Miranda. In 1966, the Miranda Court probably be
lieved all suspects would invoke their right to an attorney, and that it
was in essence extending the Escobedo v. Illinois206 ruling requiring at
torneys for "prime suspects" to the stationhouse. The intuitive predic
tion was that most suspects would in fact request an attorney, and the
warnings were a relatively incidental part of the process of imple
menting an attorney regime. As it turned out, defendants routinely
waived their Miranda rights and gave incriminating statements with-

204. Part of the problem is that the available empirical data focuses primarily on
whether Miranda has decreased confessions or clearance rates. Compare Paul G. Cassell &
Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty- Year Perspective on Miranda 's Harmful
Effect on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998), with Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Miranda 's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 500 (1 996). While I would not be surprised to learn that the Self-Incrimination
Clause decreases the number of confessions and perhaps convictions (that latter proposition
depends upon how many defendants waive their rights and whether officers obtain convic
tions by using other evidence), just as the Fourth Amendment's rule against unreasonable
search and seizures and the Sixth Amendment requirement of effective counsel probably
decrease the number of convictions, it seems to me this data is entirely irrelevant to the
question of whether Miranda dispels compulsion. These statistics on post Miranda confes
sion and clearance rates are relevant, however, to a discussion as to how far to extend the
prophylactic rule, and whether and how to design exceptions to it.
-

205. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 199 (suggesting that Court shift attention away from
the mind of the suspect and determine which interrogation techniques are improper, such as
threats of harm, promises or leniency, and the fabrication of incriminating evidence); Welsh
S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confes
sion, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 149-53 (1997) (arguing that the Due Process Clause
should establish a five hour maximum period of police interrogation, and that suspects
should be informed of this at the outset); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Con
fessions, 1 27 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1 979) (arguing that Miranda ought to be interpreted to
prohibit certain deceptive interrogation tactics).
206. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Escobedo Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to
assistance of counsel extended preindictment to police interrogations of prime suspects. See
id. at 490-91 . At the time, commentators predicted that Escobedo would effectively bar un
counseled interrogations, thus eliminating confessions. See e.g. , Yale Kamisar, Brewer v.
Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, in YA LE
KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 161
n.26 (1980) (summarizing predictions of commentators concerning Escobedo's impact). In
stead, Escobedo was subsequently limited to its peculiar facts. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 ( 1 972) ("[T]he Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts.").
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out counsel.207 Thus, the warnings themselves have become the pri
mary Miranda right. Chief Justice Rehnquist's fidelity to stare decisis
is therefore quite disingenuous. The Court reaffirmed Miranda in
Dickerson only because it turned out not to negatively impact law en
forcement. An honest Court would have asked whether a requirement
of counsel should be reaffirmed because it has evolved into a useful
set of warning requirements.
The Court picked the worst of all possible worlds when it froze in
place the status quo, without explaining how the Miranda warnings
can have "constitutional underpinnings"208 yet, unlike other constitu
tional violations, be ignored at will. The answer to this, of course, is to
label Miranda a prophylactic rule necessary only in certain circum
stances. The Court all but foreclosed this option, and squelched any
opportunity for dialogue between the Court ahd other branches of the
federal and state governments, by flatly stating that Congress "may
not supersede this Court's decisions interpreting and applying the
Constitution."209 To top it off, the Court intimated that the Miranda
decision itself was a mistake,210 (without identifying that mistake or
telling us why it was a mistake) but that it is better to be consistent
than to be right.
CONCLUSION
Had the Dickerson Court properly labeled Miranda a prophylactic
rule . designed to protect and adjudicate Fifth Amendment self
incrimination claims, this might have engendered agreement upon or
at least opened debate concerning exactly what the Self-Incrimination
Clause is designed to accomplish and how best to implement the
privilege in the stationhouse. More importantly, my conceptual
framework, in addition to accounting for Miranda and the subsequent
development of its exceptions, accounts for the many other prophylac
tic rules, safe harbors, and incidental rights in constitutional criminal
procedure. Finally, rather than either reversing Miranda and poten
tially every other prophylactic rule, safe harbor rule, and incidental
right, or freezing such rules and rights and their exceptions as "true"
constitutional interpretation, frankly labeling them as prophylactic
rules or incidental rights protecting the Fifth or some other

207. By most accounts, roughly 80% of suspects waive their Miranda rights, and the
majority go on to incriminate themselves. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV.
839 (1996); Leo, Inside Interrogation, supra note 203.
208. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2334 n.5 (2000).
209.

Id.

at 2332 (citing City of Boerne).

210. See id. at 2336 ("Whether or not this Court would agree with Miranda's reasoning
and its rule in the first instance, stare decisis weighs heavily against overruling it now.").
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Amendment has numerous advantages. It allows the Court to over
turn a rule without spending the institutional capital of a constitutional
reversal, fosters free and open discussion between the Court and state
and federal legislators, stimulates social science and empirical re
search, and encourages the Court and state and federal legislators to
experiment with different and competing rules and remedies.
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APPENDIX A
VENN DIAGRAM OF PROPHYLACTIC RULE

Prophylactic Rule of Miranda
(4 warnings)

Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
(no compelled statements)

Cops delivered

Cops violated

Miranda warnings but

Miranda but state

statement nonethe

ment was NOT

less compelled (de

compelled (officer
forgot to deliver

fendant beaten)*
Miranda
read,
statement

fourth warning to
wealthy law profes

sor)t

voluntary

If cops follow the
rule, this area very
small

*Prophylactic rule does not
underprotect; statement
suppressed on Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds.

tProphylactic rule does
overprotect; government
out of luck (statement
successfully suppressed).
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APPENDIX B
VENN DIAGRAM OF SAFE HARBOR RULE

Safe Harbor Rule of Belton
(search incident to arrest includes
passenger compartment of
automobile)

.

, , .. _ ;

Fourth Amendment Right
Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures
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.
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. . . (drivei is haiid-: ·. •..
. cuffed 100 fe�tfroin.
·.

.·

.

.

: . . If.Court designs this
rule wen,•this area.
.
•

Very small

..

*Safe Harbor rule does
underprotect; defendant out of
luck (evidence admitted
pursuant to Fourth Amendment).

tSafe Harbor rule does not
overprotect; evidence
admitted under exigent
circumstances or automobile
exceptions to warrant
requirement.

